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Explanation of Acronyms 
• ADF: Allied Democratic Forces 
• ADF-NALU: ADF-National Army for the Liberation of Uganda 
• ANC: Congolese National Army (Armée Nationale Congolaise) 
• DDR: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration 
• DPKO: Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN) 
• DRC: Democratic Republic of the Congo (RDC, Republique democratique du Congo) 
• CAN: Community Action Network 
• CLO: Civilian Liaison Officer 
• EU: European Union 
• FAR: Rwandan Defense Force (Forces armées rwandaises) 
• FARDC: The Congolese armed forces (Forces Armées de la République démocratique du Congo) 
• FDLR: Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (Forces démocratiques de libération du 
Rwanda) 
• FIB: Force Intervention Brigade, established March 2013 
• FP: Force Publique 
• ICGLR: International Conference on the Great Lakes Region 
• ICISS: International Committee on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
• M-23: March-23 Movement (Movement du 23 Mars) 
• MONUC: United Nations Organization Mission in the DR Congo, 2000-2010 
• MONUSCO: United Nations Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo, 2010-present 
• ONUC: UN Operation in the Congo, 1960-1964 
• PNC: Congolese police force (Police nationale congolaise) 
• PSC:  Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework (February 2013) 
• POC: Protection of Civilians 
• R2P: Responsibility to Protect 
• RCD-G: Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma 
• UN: United Nations 
• UNAMIR: UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda 
• UNAMID: African Union-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur 
• UNDP: United Nations Development Programme 
• UNHCR: United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
• UNICEF: United Nations Children’s Fund 
• UNMISS: UN Mission in South Sudan 
• UNMIK: United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
• UNSC: United Nations Security Council 
• UNHCR: UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
• SADC: Southern African Development Community !
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Chapter I: Introduction 
They [United Nations staff] met with us to discuss their mission and what they 
were going to do for us. I told them that they don’t do anything. We were expecting them 
to bring peace but they didn’t. They promised to send the Interhamwe [Rwandan rebel 
militia] back to their homes but they didn’t. We live in insecurity, since they do not 
protect us.” (Congolese Community Member, interview, June 2014).  
 
The United Nations Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo (MONUSCO) boasts a 
fourteen-year presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (hereafter, the DRC, the DR 
Congo, or “Congo”). The lives of many civilians in eastern Congo remain punctuated by episodes 
of violence and instability, often at the hands of foreign and Congolese rebel militias and, at 
times, as a result of human rights abuses by the Congolese police force (PNC) and military 
(Cakaj 2010, Oxfam 2014). The Rwandan genocide of 1994 and the exodus of Rwandan 
genocidaires into neighboring DRC served as a catalyst for Congo’s current instability (Nzongola 
2014, BBC 2014). Though not the sole determinant of contemporary violence, the Rwandan 
refugee crisis exacerbated existing tensions in the Congo. In response to a mushrooming 
humanitarian crisis and international violation of Congolese sovereignty on the part of rebel 
militias the United Nations (UN) authorized the UN Organization Mission in the DR Congo 
(MONUC) in 2000. Throughout Congo’s contemporary history, a complex web of armed groups 
relied on local and regional political, economic, and military support to advance their aims in 
the country’s eastern regions, often with grave consequences for Congolese civilians (Bafilemba 
and Mueller 2013). 
 In 2010 the mission changed its name to the UN Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo 
(MONUSCO) to reflect its objectives: “protect, stabilize, and consolidate peace” (MONUSCO at a 
Glance 2014). In the spring of 2013, the UN Security Council (UNSC) significantly enhanced 
MONUSCO’s offensive capacity through issuing UNSC Resolution 2098, which created a Force 
Intervention Brigade (FIB) charged with proactively neutralizing armed groups in eastern 
Congo. The resolution also identified civilian protection as the highest mission priority and 
granted MONUSCO the authority to use drone technology to monitor human rights abuses 
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(UNSC 2013). This thesis surveys MONUSCO’s civilian protection capacity as observed in June 
and July of 2014, fifteen months after the enactment of Resolution 2098.  
The central question follows: to what extent has UNSC Resolution 2098 impacted 
MONUSCO’s capacity to protect Congolese civilians? In the opening text of this analysis, I 
included a statement from a Congolese community member, in which he laments the UN’s 
inability to deliver on its promises of peace in eastern Congo. Through literary analysis and 
qualitative interview data, I construct an argument to explain why Resolution 2098 failed to 
enhance the UN’s capacity to deliver the peace dividends of civilian protection to Congolese 
civilians in the fifteen months following its enactment.  
Despite the robust legal gains of Resolutions 2098 and 2147, MONUSCO’s capacity to 
protect Congolese civilians remains limited internally through ambiguity in mandate 
interpretation, geographically irrational personnel deployment, and troop commitment. 
Additionally, two characteristics of the mission’s host-state collaboration pose barriers to its 
success: a preference for consultation with political elites to the exclusion of Congolese 
community members, and legally binding reliance on the presence of the Congolese military 
(FARDC). 
MONUSCO serves as a crucial test case for the UN’s contemporary peacekeeping 
philosophy. The legacy of civilian protection as a peacekeeping doctrine in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC) dates back to the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC, 
1960-1964). Under the authority of Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold, ONUC became the 
largest UN peacekeeping operation of the Cold War era and the first operation to authorize the 
use of force by UN troops (Mansson 2005). According to Mansson, in the eyes of 
Hammarskjold, humanitarian concerns legitimated the use of force (Mansson 2005). Other 
analyses, however, depict the Secretary-General as reluctant to employ the UN authority to use 
force in the context of ONUC, given the ambiguity of a mission with neither a clearly defined 
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Chapter VI nor Chapter VII mandate.1 (Findlay 1999). The uncertainty of ONUC’s mandate, with 
respect to its use of force as peace enforcement, in many ways served to foreshadow the 
ambiguity that would dominate the mission mandates of MONUC and MONUSCO in the 21st 
century.  
MONUSCO continues to evolve in concert with the evolution of UN peacekeeping 
philosophy. In the early 21st century, political and scholarly debate produced robust 
international political support for the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)2. R2P doctrine arose from 
scholarly critique of the failure of collective security in the final decade of the 21st century (ICISS 
2001). The UN’s operations in the DR Congo present one of the first examples of this doctrine in 
practice, as evidenced by increasingly robust civilian protection mandates (Mansson 2005). It is 
the objective of my research, therefore, to evaluate the efficacy of MONUSCO in light of R2P 
doctrine. As support for R2P norms grew, the UN granted greater aggressive capacity to its 
Mission in the DR Congo (MONUC, 2000-2010). These developments took place in the context 
of waning support for absolute state sovereignty and increased international political 
mobilization around the ideals of human rights and civilian protection (Boutros-Ghali 1992, 
Mansson 2005, UNSC 2010, UNSC 2013).   
In March 2013, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2098. This resolution 
remains significant not only for the primacy it places on civilian protection, but also because the 
document authorized the first-ever offensive battalion included in a UN force- the Force 
Intervention Brigade (FIB). The resolution also afforded MONUSCO the freedom to employ 
drone surveillance technology in order to monitor armed groups in the DRC and prevent human 
rights abuses by militias and the FARDC. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Chapter VII of the UN charter permits a UN force to use “punitive measures” to impose its decisions. Chapter VII is often 
associated with “peace enforcement,” while Chapter VI concerns traditional peacekeeping (Findlay 1999). 
2 According to the United Nations, R2P dictates that “Prevention requires apportioning responsibility to and promoting 
collaboration between concerned States and the international community. The duty to prevent and halt genocide and mass atrocities 
lies first and foremost with the State, but the international community has a role that cannot be blocked by the invocation of 
sovereignty. Sovereignty no longer exclusively protects States from foreign interference; it is a charge of responsibility where States 
are accountable for the welfare of their people” (UN Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide 2014). 
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Four components comprise MONUSCO’s current mandate as given in UNSC Resolution 
2098: the protection of civilians, the neutralization of armed groups, monitoring the illicit flow 
of arms across the DRC’s eastern border, and supporting Congolese and international judicial 
processes (UNSC 2013). In this thesis, I evaluate MONUSCO’s performance with respect to this 
first component: civilian protection. Following the post-Cold War emergence of R2P doctrine, 
support mounted for the protection of human rights as a legitimate objective of collective 
security arrangements such as the UN. After the end of the cold war, the United Nations and 
other international organizations became increasingly willing to intervene in intrastate conflicts 
in order to protect the rights of individual citizens (Barnett and Weiss 2008). This development 
marked a gradual departure from reliance on state sovereignty3 as the primary threshold for 
international intervention (Prendergast 2015, ICISS 2001).  MONUSCO and its increasingly 
robust mandates reflect this change in international public opinion and may serve as a test case 
through which to evaluate the practical implementation of this new perspective on international 
peacekeeping. UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2098 (March 2013) grants MONUSCO 
power to “use all means necessary” to protect civilians. UNSC Resolution 2147 (2014) 
additionally affirms MONUSCO’s capacity to offensively target militias and engage in 
preventative drone surveillance (UNSC 2014). To what extent has this watershed mandate, and 
the contingent creation of the FIB, impacted the mission's capacity to protect civilians in South 
Kivu, DRC?  
 MONUSCO’s capacity remains limited in ways that constrain the impact of Resolutions 
2098 and 2147. These limitations arise internally and through the ways in which the mission 
chooses to engage local actors. Internally, MONUSCO’s constraints lie in a lack of uniform 
standards for intervention and “civilian protection,” a geographic discrepancy between the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!3!During the first five decades of its existence, the UN relied primarily on state sovereignty as a threshold for peacekeeping 
intervention. The principle of state sovereignty dictates that state governments possess complete autonomy over affairs within their 
national borders, and may govern in any way they choose. While interstate violations of sovereignty necessitate intervention, under 
this principle intrastate conflict-conflict within states- remains outside the jurisdiction of the United Nations and other collective 
bodies (ICISS 2001).!
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location of MONUSCO resources and the epicenter of Congo’s current conflict, and individual-
level shortcomings among MONUSCO troops regarding skill and commitment. Additionally, in 
collaborating with the Congolese nation, MONUSCO’s continued preference for consultation 
with political elites at the expense of community inclusion limits the mission’s ability to respond 
to the needs of Congolese civilians. Collaboration also fails in areas in which Congolese military 
(FARDC) capacity hinders MONUSCO capacity in cases in which the two forces must legally 
cooperate in pursuit of armed groups. 
 This analysis provides a theoretical foundation for understanding international 
peacekeeping philosophy and the historical origins of today’s more aggressive approach to 
collective security. Historical analysis also details the development of conflict and instability in 
the DRC. An overview of colonial and contemporary contributors to the DR Congo’s current 
political situation provides context for understanding the conflict. Chapter 2 contains an 
analysis of contemporary peacekeeping ideology and of the origins of violence in Congo.  
 In Chapters 3 and 4, qualitative interviews provide the basis for the present argument: 
both internal and collaboration-level factors continue to limit MONUSCO’s civilian protection 
capacity, despite increased authority and capacity afforded to the mission through Resolutions 
2098 and 2147. Interviews include conversations with Congolese communities and UN staff 
(foreign and Congolese). A full description of interview methodology may be found at the 
conclusion of the present chapter, while interview scripts are included in the appendix. 
 
Evaluating MONUSCO: 3 Essential Contributors to Peacekeeping Success 
In his 1992 report An Agenda for Peace, former Secretary General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali identifies three criteria that he deems foundational for successful peacekeeping: a clear 
mission mandate, cooperation from local parties, and “buy-in” (operationalized as financial and 
troop contributions) on the part of UN member states (Boutros-Ghali 1992). My own research 
identifies Boutros-Ghali’s first two criteria--mandate clarity and local collaboration-- as 
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limitations to MONUSCO’s capacity to protect civilians. In the following chapters, I argue that 
MONUSCO possesses the requisite financial and material resources to protect civilians in 
eastern DRC. Boutros-Ghali’s conditions of mandate clarity and local cooperation, in contrast, 
prove stumbling blocks for MONUSCO’s success. 
With a personnel total of over 22,000 (including over 19,000 military personnel) and an 
annual budget of $1,398,475,300, MONUSCO remains many respects the most robust UN 
mission to date (MONUSCO 2015). In November 2013, facing a 3,000 strong FIB, the notorious 
March-23 Movement (M-23) surrendered after a twenty-month campaign of terror, vowing to 
henceforth pursue purely political means to redress grievances (Maphosa 2013). Given these 
factors, it would seem that the UN and others are justified in heralding MONUSCO as a success 
for the organization, for R2P, and for collective security as a whole.  
MONUSCO possesses a discernable advantage in comparison to previous UN 
deployments on the “international support” dimension. This is not to say that the international 
community remains unwaveringly supportive (in rhetoric and in practice) of mission success, 
but rather that observable progress continues to take place in this realm.  In early summer 2013, 
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry appointed former Senator Russ Feingold of Wisconsin to 
serve as U.S. special envoy to the Great Lakes region, symbolizing increased commitment to the 
DRC peace process on the part of the United States and building upon the appointment of UN 
special envoy Mary Robinson in March of that year (Kerry 2013, Bachelet 2013, Myers 2013).  
Feingold and Robinson’s positions are not novel, and in fact in the midst of the two Congo wars, 
the European Union, the United States, and the U.S. each sent special envoys to the region 
(Cayarannis 2009). These developments demonstrate shifting political will in favor of increased 
international engagement with the DRC. Additionally, MONUSCO’s 19,000 troops and nearly 
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1.4 billion USD budget suggest that the mission has, on paper, earned the material support of 
the international community4 (MONUSCO 2015). 
In March 2013, the UN afforded MONUSCO the most robust peacekeeping mandate to 
date. UNSC 2098 authorizes MONUSCO to “use all means necessary” to protect civilians in 
eastern DRC and even to actively seek out armed militias in the region for the purposes of 
neutralization. The resolution additionally provides for the creation of a Force Intervention 
Brigade (FIB) to undertake this new offensive role and allows the UN to use drone technology in 
DR Congo’s eastern provinces for surveillance and monitoring (UNSC 2013). This most recent 
mandate evolved from a history of more ambiguous, less robust resolutions on the part of the 
Security Council. Resolution 1291 (2000) authorized MONUSCO, then MONUC, to use “any 
action…it deemed within its capabilities” to protect civilians “under imminent threat of physical 
force” (UNSC 2000, emphasis added). UNSC Resolution 1484 (2003) authorized an Interim 
Multinational Force (IEMF)- comprised of EU troops- to intervene in eastern Congo following a 
surge in violence in Bunia in May 2003. The resolution permitted the use of force for civilian 
protection if the situation required such action (UNSC 2003). In her study of UNSC resolutions 
on the DR Congo from 2000-2006, Mansson asserts that the language of MONUC’s mandates 
grew stronger and included more explicit references to the protection of civilians over this 
period (Mansson 2006).  
MONUSCO’s current mandate evolved over a 13-year period. UNSC 2098 is novel in the 
context of UN peacekeeping for both its clarity and provision for civilian protection. Research by 
Mansson (2006) demonstrates a trend in increasing clarity and potency for MONUC mandates 
during the period 2000-2005.  Resolutions 2098 (2013) and 2147 (2014) form the foundation 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!4!In the context of this study, I repeatedly refer to the “international community” as it relates to a global community of nations 
epitomized by the UN. Two critiques of this specific language, however, necessitate acknowledgement: first, statistical realities 
dictate that in the UN and many other supranational institutions, a select cohort of wealthy nations exert considerable influence on 
decisions of global significance (Power 2015, Ferguson 2006, UNSC 2015). A second critique emerges from the history of the idea of 
an international community. One school of thought dates this concept to colonial-era quests to “civilize” the global South. The 
modern manifestation of this salvation mindset emerges in the idea that industrialized nations-the “global community”- possess a 
responsibility to “save” nations and individuals in the midst of conflict (Rieff 2002).!!
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for MONUSCO’s current mandate and build upon this legacy of enhanced clarity and proactive 
aggression. However, Resolution 2098 (2013) and its successor, Resolution 2147 (2014) lack the 
clarity sufficient to ensure the uniform protection of civilians in eastern Congo. While 
MONUSCO does possess enhanced legal authority through which to intervene militarily on 
behalf of noncombatants, the absence of institutionalized standards for intervention leaves too 
much to the interpretation of individual UN troops. The end result of this dilemma is that troops 
often fail to intervene in situations in which Congolese civilians feel that such intervention may 
be justified (Congolese Community Members, interview, June 2014). Chapter 3 contains a full 
analysis of MONUSCO’s problems with intervention clarity. 
Despite measurable improvement in buy-in from the international community, 
coordination with local institutions also remains an area of concern in the DRC. It is for this 
reason that my evaluation renders MONUSCO’s success acutely limited.  In particular, avenues 
for information-sharing and joint operations between the Forces Armées de la République 
Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) and MONUSCO are often not exploited (Cakaj 2010). In 
calling upon MONUSCO to take all means necessary to protect civilians, the UNSC likewise 
mandates that the mission should  
“Work with the Government of the DRC to identify threats to civilians and 
Implement existing response plans to ensure the protection of civilians from 
abuses and violations of human rights and violations of international 
humanitarian law, including all forms of sexual and gender-based violence and 
grave violations against children” (UNSC 2013, p.7). 
The failure of the UN to work collaboratively with the Congolese state in an effort to 
protect civilians is attributable to both minimal state presence and capacity in DR Congo’s 
eastern regions and to a lack of cohesive integration within the UN mission itself (Brahimi 
2000, Maphosa 2013, Cakaj 2010). This research additionally identifies poor collaborative 
priorities-defined as favoring consultation with political elites above engagement with 
Congolese communities-as a significant shortcoming in MONUSCO’s current operating model 
(Congolese Community Members, interview, June 2014). Boutros-Ghali, writing in An Agenda 
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for Peace, affirms that peacekeeping is most effective at the invitation of the state in question 
(Boutros-Ghali 1992).  If MONUSCO is to truly exemplify the ideals of R2P for the benefit of 
Congolese civilians, concerted effort must be made by the UN to enlist the support of the 
Congolese state and Congolese communities more broadly. 
 
Methodology 
This study focuses on qualitative data gathered from semi-structured interviews with 
community members from Kalehe, a village in South Kivu, DRC.5 In addition to these 
community representatives, I also interview current and former employees of MONUSCO in 
Bukavu, South Kivu, DRC. Interviews took place during the months of June and July 2014.  
Through interviewing both UN personnel and Congolese civilians, my aim is to construct a 
comprehensive picture of MONUSCO’s progress with regard to civilian protection. Qualitative 
data obtained through interviews provide insight into the perception that both UN personnel 
and Congolese citizens have of MONUSCO’s effectiveness and may shed light on the ways the 
mission is impacting local populations in less quantifiably discernable ways.  
In conducting interviews, I use March 2013 as a benchmark for measuring progress, attempting 
to gauge whether UN staff and Congolese community members report any change in 
MONUSCO’s capacity to protect civilians in South Kivu province.  
Through assessing personal interviews, I shed light on several crucial contributors to 
MONUSCO’s limited performance that are not readily identifiable within the confines of 
statistical data. Interview data reveal that MONUSCO’s progress toward efficient civilian 
protection remains limited by both internal constraints and constraints experienced in the 
context of host-country collaboration. Internal constraints include a lack of uniform standards 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!5!Hereafter, I refer to community member respondents as either “community members” or “community representatives” to signify 
their role in my study in representing the perspectives of local residents in Kalehe. In Chapter 4, I draw a primary distinction 
between these “community members” and Congolese political elites. Community respondents were not screened for membership in 
any formal community or non-governmental organization.!
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for intervention, a mismatch in the geographic distribution of MONUSCO resources relative to 
the concentration of violence, and shortcomings in individual troop quality and commitment. 
Regarding the mission’s capacity to work in tandem with the Congolese state, MONUSCO 
consistently prioritizes elite-level political collaboration over inclusive consultation with 
Congolese community members. Additionally, a lack of capacity within the FARDC serves to 
limit MONUSCO’s ability to protect local civilians, particularly in cases where the mission may 
not legally operate independently of the Congolese military. 
This study draws from a series of fourteen interviews conducted in South Kivu province, 
DRC.  These interviews consist of conversations with nine community members from Kalehe, a 
village in South Kivu province, as well as six interviews with UN personnel based in Bukavu, 
South Kivu, DRC.  
To identify suitable interview subjects, I used snowball sampling methodology, relying 
on local key informants to provide appropriate contacts. The numerical discrepancy between 
community members and UN personnel reflects the nature of the sampling method used and is 
not a component of research design. Interviews ranged from thirty minutes to one hour in 
duration, and consisted of twelve or thirteen open-ended questions for UN personnel and 
community representatives, respectively. Interview questions served to situate each individual 
in the context of his or her relationship to MONUSCO and the civilian population in South Kivu 
province, and to assess each subject’s perception of MONUSCO’s effectiveness in protecting 
Congolese civilians.  Questions give special attention to Resolution 2098 (2013) as a marker of 
time. Following a discussion of each participant’s understanding of the mission’s mandate as 
defined in Resolution 2098, participations reflect on the mission’s efficacy both before and after 
the enactment of this resolution. At the conclusion of each interview, participants elaborated on 
any insights not addressed in the preceding questions. A copy of each interview script is 
included in the appendix. I recorded each interview session with the use of audio recording 
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technology. Interview participants chose to participate in recorded interviews or to opt out of 
audio recording, in which transcriptions consisted of hand-written notes. Two interview 
respondents chose not to participate in audio recording. Written consent forms included an 
option to opt out of audio recording. Interviews were conducted in English for all UN personnel. 
For community interviews, I employed a professional translator to facilitate communication in 
Kiswahili, French, and Maashi. Copies of written consent forms and interview scripts were 
available to participants in Kiswahili, French, and English. 
While semi-structured interviews offer depth and insight not always present in 
quantitative research, the methodology employed in this study is limited in several important 
ways. First, the short-term nature of my fieldwork inhibited the establishment of a rapport with 
interview respondents, thus potentially precluding full and honest disclosure. Second, my 
identity as an American university student and researcher complicated the development of a 
trust relationship with Congolese participants. In the context of this dynamic, Congolese 
respondents may have perceived an incentive to respond in a manner desirable to a Western 
audience. Finally, while I employed the services of a professional Congolese translator, 
interviews conducted in multiple languages inevitably pose a risk of misinterpretation and the 
loss of nuance. 
MONUSCO: An Experiment in Aggressive Peace Keeping 
 MONUSCO’s current presence in the DRC dates to February 2000, when the Security 
Council authorized the deployment of the UN Mission in the DR Congo (MONUC) to implement 
the Lusaka cease-fire agreement, which brought a formal end to the Second Congo War. Angola, 
the DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe signed the agreement (Lusaka 
Ceasefire Agreement 1999).  The UNSC gave MONUC a Chapter VII mandate, authorizing UN 
troops to use force, to the extent permitted by UN capabilities, to protect civilians in the DRC 
(Mansson 2005). In a detailed analysis of UNSC resolutions from 2000 to 2004, human rights 
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researcher Katarina Mansson provides compelling evidence for the increasing influence of 
human rights and civilian protection concerns on mandates given to UN missions (Mansson 
2005). This progression toward a broader understanding of intervention culminated in March 
2013 with the authorization of the UN Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) under the umbrella of 
MONUSCO.  The FIB’s mandate broke new ground in affording UN troops unprecedented 
offensive capacity to neutralize armed groups in eastern DR Congo (Nkusi 2013, UNSC 2013).  
 
The UN in the 1990s: A New Era of Conflict  
 In order to understand the political climate that laid the groundwork for MONUSCO in 
its current state, one must understand the crisis of credibility confronting UN peacekeeping in 
the immediate post-Cold War period. In 1945, 51 nations signed the Charter of the United 
Nations (UN), pledging to never again let the world fall victim to the “scourge of war” (Brahimi 
2000, United Nations 2011).  Between 1945 and 1990, the international community witnessed 
100 major conflicts resulting in the loss of 20 million lives. During this time, the UNSC vetoed 
279 proposed missions (Boutros-Ghali 1992).  In 1993, anarchy triumphed in Somalia as 
ineffective strategy implementation limited UN success (ICISS 2001). In the spring of 1994, 
government-backed Interhamwe forces slaughtered nearly one million Rwandan civilians as a 
Security Council resolution reduced the troop size of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda 
(UNAMIR) from 2,548 to 270 military personnel (United Nations 1997, Dallaire 2004). While a 
post-Cold War UN proved increasingly willing to intervene in intrastate conflicts, few if any of 
these interventions brought about the realization of peace (Barnett and Weiss 2008, Bratt 1996).  
 The immediate post-Cold War period brought about a heightened sense of optimism in 
the West concerning the UN’s ability to protect against the “scourge of war” and about the 
prospects of collective action more broadly (Boutros-Ghali 1992, ICISS 2001). By the turn of the 
21st century, however, the failures of Somalia, Rwanda, Kosovo, and Bosnia caused many to 
question the efficacy of the UN as a mechanism for collective security (ICISS 2001). Faced with a 
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crisis of credibility, former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan commissioned a high-level panel, 
chaired by former Algerian Foreign Minister Brahimi to evaluate the status of UN peace keeping 
(Brahimi 2000). As the UN scrambled to respond to international criticism, momentum built 
globally for an emerging peacekeeping doctrine referred to as the Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P).  Debates arose in attempt to strike the proper balance between state sovereignty, on the 
one hand, and intervention on the basis of grave human rights violations, on the other, in the 
face of violent conflict. Growing consensus affirmed the purpose of the UN and other collective 
bodies as guardians of the rights of individual citizens, rather than as merely trustees of 
international peace and security (ICISS 2001, International Institute of Peace 2014). Though 
R2P failed to garner acceptance as a legally binding construct, its implicit implications for UN 
peacekeeping continue to impact the organization’s approach to intervention. Over the past 
decade, the UN sought to “mainstream” human rights concerns, giving the goal of intrastate 
civilian protection a place at the table, so to speak, with traditional concern for interstate 
security and stability (Mansson 2005). 
   
Human Rights and International Intervention in the DRC: Historical 
Considerations 
The issue of civilian protection is particularly poignant in the DR Congo, given the 
nation’s history of exploitation at the hands of external “meddlers.” The Congo basin’s rich 
natural wealth has long been the product of envy, both on the part of its immediate neighbors 
and on the part of oppressive colonial subjugators (Hochschild 1998). King Leopold II of 
Belgium first subjected the nation to such abuse in the late 19th century, when he cunningly 
obtained the DRC as his own personal territory and proceeded to enslave Congolese civilians, 
forcing them to procure rubber under threat of murder, rape, and torture. The transfer of 
Congolese territory from Leopold’s private property into a Belgian colonial possession did little 
to halt the oppression of the native Congolese (Hochschild 1998, Nzongola 2002). Competition 
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for the nation’s resources continued through the 20th century, culminating in the First and 
Second Congo Wars (Lusaka Agreement 1999). Today, over forty armed groups remain in 
eastern DRC, pillaging Congo of its resources, with disastrous consequences in the form of 
civilian casualties and human rights violations (Maphosa 2013). In this context, the effective 
realization of R2P on the part of MONUSCO remains imperative. The United Nations has a 
responsibility to protect the DRC from this recurrent “scourge of war.” 
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Chapter II: MONUSCO and International Peacekeeping Philosophy 
Prior to the defeat of the March 23 Movement (M-23) rebel militia in the fall of 2013, 
media critics and even the UN itself cited MONUSCO as one of the most ineffective 
peacekeeping forces in the world (Tull 2009, England 2005). Others point out, however, that 
UN failure in the Great Lakes region, and in the DRC in particular, is partially attributable to the 
complex political and physical geography of the country (Karlsrud and Rosen 2013, Tull 2009). 
In fact, Tull (2009) identifies conflict in the DR Congo, by global comparison, as a political 
environment extraordinarily resistant to peacekeeping (Tull 2009). Tull assesses that the high 
number of warring factions, the presence of an ongoing (versus a resolved) conflict, the 
existence of natural resource wealth as a profit source for competing parties (regional and 
global), the weakness of state institutions, and frequent territorial incursions by neighboring 
states each contribute to the political volatility of the region (Tull 2009, BBC 2014).  
In order to draw any valid conclusions regarding MONUSCO’s efforts to protect 
Congolese civilians, one must first understand both the historical context for conflict in DR 
Congo and the evolution of UN peacekeeping philosophy. In what follows, I describe the 
particular progression of UN peacekeeping philosophy from a nation-centered doctrine to one of 
increasing concern for individual rights. Additionally, I draw upon Congolese and international 
scholarship to present the contemporary conflict in the DRC through a historical framework. 
After laying the groundwork for an understanding of UN peacekeeping, more generally, and UN 
peacekeeping in the DRC, in particular, I provide commentary on the current state of affairs in 
eastern Congo. Finally, I review arguments on peacekeeping evaluation, using indicators 
described in peacekeeping scholarship to evaluate UN operations in DR Congo. This theoretical 
foundation serves as the framework through which I assess MONUSCO’s progress in terms of 
civilian protection capacity in the 1.5 years between the enactment of UNSC Resolution 2098 
(March 2013) and the time of data collection (June-July 2014). Interviews with Congolese 
community members and UN staff aim to answer the following question, as indicated in Chapter 
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1: to what extent did the enactment of UNSC Resolution 2098 (2013) impact MONUSCO’s 
ability to protect Congolese civilians in the months between March 2013 and July 2014?  
 
The Evolution of Western Peacekeeping Philosophy 
 As the Second World War came to a close, the signatories of the UN charter 
vowed to never again let humankind fall victim to the “scourge of war” (Simma 1994). This 
optimism was in fact short-lived. The realties of Cold War geopolitics tainted the international 
idealism of collective security: between 1945 and 1988, the UNSC only authorized 13 
peacekeeping operations (Bratt 1996). 20 million lives were lost during the 100 major conflicts 
that took place during these four decades (Boutros-Ghali 1992). With the thawing of relations 
between the East and West, many Westerners looked upon the UN with renewed optimism, 
confident that in this environment of cooperation the organization could finally realize the aims 
set forth in its 1945 Charter. In An Agenda for Peace (1992), former UN-Secretary General 
Boutros-Boutros Ghali summarizes this ubiquitous optimism: 
 
“In these past months the conviction has grown, among nations large and small, 
that an opportunity has been regained to achieve the great objectives of the Charter- a 
United Nations capable of maintaining international peace and security, of securing 
justice and human rights and of promoting, in the words of the Charter, ‘social progress 
and better standards of life in larger freedom’” (Boutros-Ghali 1992, p. 1). 
 
 
It remains imperative to note, however, that such notions of Cold War era peace and 
post-Cold War optimism reflect a uniquely Western view of international conflict. As David Rieff 
notes in A Bed for the Night (2002), 
 
 
“In this sense, Immanuel Kant’s dream of a world of states in which perpetual 
peace reigned, while hardly the norm anywhere else in the world, has become part of the 
political DNA of the West. And so the gap widens between this Western world, in which 
the primacy of individual rights is taken for granted and in which peace is assumed to be 
the natural state of things, and that huge part of the world in which war is either an 
everyday reality or a looming threat.” (Rieff 2002, p. 50). 
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Global Conflict in a Changing World 
 As the world entered the final decade of the twentieth century, illusions of post-Cold War 
harmony shattered as conflicts in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Africa threatened 
notions of global peace and security as understood by the affluent West. While world peace 
remained elusive, by 1990 the nature of large-scale violence had begun to change. Writing for 
Foreign Policy in 2011, Joshua Goldstein argues that the interstate wars that defined much of 
the twentieth century, gave way to “asymmetric guerilla warfare” with the arrival of the new 
millennium (Goldstein 2011). Eriksson and Wallenstein (2004) echo Goldstein’s argument 
about the changing nature of conflict: the authors demonstrate that of the 116 active conflicts in 
the 1989-2003 period, only seven involved nation states warring against one another (Eriksson 
and Wallensteen 2004). 
During the post-Cold War period, states and sub-state actors perpetrated violence 
against their own citizens with increasing frequency, and traditional interstate wars became an 
exception rather than the rule. This new paradigm for large-scale violence presented an 
opportunity for the UN to provide collective security uninhibited by the ideological stalemates of 
the preceding decades (Boutros-Ghali 1992). Goldstein refers to the early 1990s as the “boom 
years” for UN peacekeeping. 1991-1993 witnessed the authorization of fifteen new peacekeeping 
missions-two more missions than the UNSC authorized during the entire Cold War era 
(Goldstein 2011).  
 
Crisis of Credibility: the Early 1990s  
 Unfortunately for the United Nations, achieving the objectives of the Charter proved 
unattainably difficult during these “boom years.” In the Horn of Africa, the United Nations 
Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) failed to fulfill its mandate of “establishing throughout 
Somalia a secure environment for humanitarian assistance” during a regional famine (Bratt 
1996, UNSC 1993, p. 4).  At the time of the UN’s exodus from the country in the summer of 
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1993, cholera and starvation still ran rampant, and peacekeepers found themselves embroiled in 
a civil war (Bratt 1996). The public massacre of eighteen American soldiers in Mogadishu in 
June 1993 further highlighted UNOSOM’s failures and cemented Western aversion to 
peacekeeping for the remainder of the decade (Bratt 1996, Goldstein 2011, Power 2013, Dallaire 
2004). 
 In the mid-1990s, a crisis of credibility began to undermine public confidence in the UN. 
The impetus for this plummeting popular legitimacy largely dates to the performance of the UN 
Assistance Mission In Rwanda (UNAMIR). The UN arrived in Rwanda--a small central African 
nation about the size of Maryland--in 1993 to oversee the implementation of the Arusha 
Accords, a peace deal ostensibly marking the conclusion of a three year civil war between the 
Hutu-dominated Rwandan government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front, a rebel army 
comprised largely of exiled Rwandan Tutsi (Dallaire 2004, Nzongola 2014a). On the evening of 
April 6, the plane carrying Rwanda’s moderate Hutu president Juvenal Habyarimana was shot 
down. Immediately following the assassination, the presidential guard and radical Hutu militias 
known as the Interhamwe began indiscriminately executing Rwandan Tutsi and moderate Hutu 
(Dallaire 2004, Nzongola 2014a).  Refusing to heed Canadian General Romeo Dallaire’s 
warnings of impending political violence, the United Nations reduced UNAMIR’s personnel to a 
mere 270 troops. Given that the mission’s mandate never moved beyond Chapter VI, UN 
protocol prohibited these 270 troops from intervening forcefully on behalf of Rwandan civilians 
(Dallaire 2004, BBC 2014). Over the next three months, the Interhamwe and the Forces armées 
rwandaises (FAR), the Rwandan national army, succeeded in massacring civilian men, women, 
and children at rate of killing three times that of the Holocaust (Dallaire 2004, Nzongola 2014a). 
The Rwandan genocide occurred in the context of an ongoing civil war, in which both the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)-a Tutsi rebel militia led by Paul Kagame-and Hutu extremists 
bore responsibility for committing indiscriminate acts of violence against civilians. Following 
the victory of the RPF in July 1994 and Paul Kagame’s assumption of power, an influx of Hutu 
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refugees poured into eastern Congo. This migration included both perpetrators of genocide and 
Hutus who chose not to participate, but who nevertheless feared what the hypothetical 
imposition of “victor’s justice” might mean for their chances of survival in the new Rwanda (BBC 
2014, Umutesi 2004).  
 
Peacekeeping in the 21st Century: Evaluation, Debate and Reform 
 The aftermath of the Rwandan genocide generated consequences both for the 
development of civilian-centered peacekeeping philosophy and for regional peace and stability 
in Africa’s Great Lakes Region. I will speak more specifically on conflict in the Great Lakes 
region at the conclusion of this chapter. In what follows, I explain how Rwanda, together with 
the UN’s other boom-era failures, sparked a decade of debate and dialogue on the objectives of 
international peacekeeping in the 21st century. 
 The UN as an institution did not emerge unscathed from the early 1990s, and this fact 
did not escape leadership within the organization. In 2000, Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
commissioned a high-level panel to conduct a comprehensive review of peacekeeping 
operations. Former Algerian Foreign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi chaired the panel and produced 
the sweeping Brahimi Report (Brahimi 2000). The report identified many arenas in which the 
UN preformed unsatisfactorily, including recruitment and retention of skilled personnel, 
technological innovation, rapid deployment capacity, mandate clarity, and organizational 
cohesion (Brahimi 2000). While the report leveraged a pointed critique at the UN’s internal 
structure, the commission also attempted to shift some of its boom-era guilt to the international 
community. In a final section of the report entitled “Challenges to Implementation,” the 
commission states, 
 “Member states must recognize that the United Nations is the sum of its parts 
and accept that the primary responsibility for reform lies with them” (Brahimi 2000, p. 
44). 
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The report continues to denounce the actions of the international community, and of the five 
permanent members of the security in particular. Brahimi writes, 
 “[The] Security Council and Member States crafted and supported ambiguous, 
inconsistent and under-funded mandates and then stood back and watched as they 
failed…” (Brahimi 2000, p. 44). 
 
Brahimi’s pointed critique of UN member states appears justified in the context of the campaign 
against proactive UN engagement in Rwanda-a campaign led by the United States and 
championed by much of the Western world (Brahimi 2000, Dallaire 2004, Power 2013, Stearns 
2011). 
 
Breaking New Ground: the “Responsibility to Protect” 
 Where the Brahimi commission’s recommendations centered on structural shortcomings 
within the UN and ambivalence within the world community, the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) contested that the problem with international 
peacekeeping lay not within substandard organizational capacity but with the UN’s failure to 
adapt to the changing dynamics of international violence in the twenty-first century (ICISS 
2001, Goldstein 2011). In this groundbreaking report, the commission attempted to challenge 
contemporary peacekeeping frameworks, which held state sovereignty as a sacred truth. Where 
others argued that the intervention of UN peacekeepers violated the territorial and political 
sovereignty of nation-states, the report presented state sovereignty and collective security as 
complementary constructs. The commission found that each state bore the primary 
responsibility for the protection of its citizens. In the event that a state proved unable or 
unwilling to carry out this duty, however, it became the duty of the international community to 
provide the state in question with the support necessary to protect the rights of individuals 
within its borders (ICISS 2001). This new doctrine, henceforth referred to in international 
relations as the “Responsibility to Protect” or R2P, evolved logically from the UN’s disappointing 
boom-era performance as a global protector of civilians (ICISS 2001, Bratt 1996). In a world in 
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which an increasing percentage of civilians suffer atrocities at the hands of their own 
governments or non-state actors, ICISS advocates for a paradigm shift in peacekeeping 
(Goldstein 2011). According to R2P, the responsibility of UN peacekeepers extends beyond 
interstate conflict resolution to the protection of individual civilians (ICISS 2001). Though R2P 
never attained de jure legal status, it is increasingly employed as a de facto standard used to 
advocate for the authorization of new missions and to evaluate existing operations (Oatley 
2013). Reflective of mounting international support for R2P, the UN established an Expert 
Group on the Protection of Civilians in 2009. The group reports periodically to the UNSC on the 
impact of conflict on civilians in areas in which the UN supports active peacekeeping missions 
(International Institute of Peace 2014). 
 In summary, at the turn of the 21st century, mounting global discontent caused the UN to 
undertake a comprehensive evaluation of its peacekeeping operations. At the same time, parallel 
momentum built for R2P and a rejection of orthodox conceptions of peacekeeping in favor of a 
collective security subservient to the rights of individual citizens. The UNSC authorized its 
Mission in the DR Congo (MONUC) in 1999, in the midst of this dialogue regarding the purpose 
and performance of peacekeeping operations (Nzongola 2014a). Thus, two factors--shifting 
peacekeeping paradigms and the complex political situation characterizing the Great Lakes 
region of Africa--continue to interact to produce an unprecedented and perpetually evolving 
dilemma for the UN in DR Congo. The marriage of R2P norms with a complex political dynamic 
creates a situation in which the UN is increasingly expected to protect Congolese civilians in a 
challenging environment that is often physically and politically not conducive to robust 
peacekeeping operations. Having briefly addressed turn-of-the-century epoch of peacekeeping 
debate and reform, I now provide a concise historical account of the contemporary conflict in 
eastern DRC. 
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The 1994 Rwandan Genocide and Instability in the Great Lakes Region 
 Rwanda’s tragic three-month genocide in 1994 continues to pose consequences 
extending beyond this short time period and beyond national borders. An influx of armed 
Rwandan genocidaires into eastern Congo may be traced to the conclusion of the genocide and 
the assumption of power by the RPF (Stearns 2011, Nzongola 2014a, BBC 2014).  In the summer 
of 1994, DR Congo absorbed an influx of 1.5 million Rwandan refugees, including hundreds of 
thousands of armed Hutu extremists, in camps near Goma and Bukavu, DRC (Nzongola 2014a, 
BBC 2014). Congolese citizens cite the presence of the Forces Democratic Forces for the 
Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) in particular as a key obstruction to regional peace. Formed in 
2000 by a coalition of former Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR) and Interhamwe militants, the 
FDLR today largely targets ethnic Tutsi civilians in Congo’s North and South Kivu provinces. An 
estimated 1,500 to 2,000 remaining forces make the FDLR the single largest illegal armed group 
remaining in eastern Congo today (MONUSCO 2014, Radio Okapi 2014b). 
 The role of regional actors- Rwanda and Uganda- in perpetuating instability in eastern 
Congo remains robust (BBC 2014). Though I will later explain these Rwandan and Ugandan 
incursions in greater detail, a basic understanding of Congolese history is necessary to develop a 
complete picture of the factors that coalesced at the turn of the 21st century to make the Congo 
vulnerable to foreign invasion.  These factors may be traced to colonial exploitation at the hands 
of the Belgian state, neocolonial strategies executed by the UN, the U.S., and Belgium to prevent 
the realization of a unified Congolese democracy, poor governance by an autocratic kleptocracy 
following independence (De Witte 2001, Haviv 2015). These sources of Congolese state decay 
are discussed in the following sections. 
 
Belgian Colonialism in the Congo  
 In the nineteenth century, Congo’s story of incorporation into the global political and 
economic system began as a narrative of exploitation at the hands of a Western external 
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“meddler”- namely, Belgium (Hochschild 1998, Nzongola 2002). The Democratic Republic of 
Congo possesses impressive natural wealth in forest resources, hydropower, and minerals. 
Opportunistic “investors” across the decades coveted (and continue to covet) Congo’s uranium 
(a precious Cold War-era commodity used in nuclear weaponry), tantalum (an essential mineral 
in consumer electronics products), and gold, among many other minerals (Nzongola 2002). In 
one of the bleakest tragic ironies of modern society, the citizens of DR Congo, among the poorest 
people in the world, continue to be the victims rather than the beneficiaries of their nation’s 
wealth (Nzongola 2002). 
 King Leopold II of Belgium established the Congo Free State (CFS) as his own personal 
possession in 1885, and proceeded to institutionalize the pillage of the Congo basin (Hochschild 
1998, Nzongola 2002). In 1908, colonial authority transferred from Leopold to the Belgian state, 
while exploitation continued. In 1921, the Belgian minister for colonial affairs stated frankly that 
Belgium’s Congo colony existed primarily to “develop the economic action of Belgium” (Franck 
1921). Beginning in 1891, CFS law mandated that Congolese men and women supply the state 
with daily quotas of rubber and ivory. Leopold additionally subjected citizens to periods of 
forced servitude. Colonial administrators used public punishment- torture by the chicotte, or 
whip, in addition to rape and murder- to enforce quota fulfillment (Nzongola 2002).   
 
Toward an Independent Congo: Patrice Lumumba and Congolese Nationalism 
In Lumumba Speaks, Patrice Lumumba, Congo’s first Prime Minister, describes his 
nation’s independence struggle as one of the most rapid transfers of power on the whole of the 
African continent (Lumumba 1958-1960). Lumumba believed wholeheartedly in a strong, 
unified, and independent Congo structured to economically and politically benefit all Congolese, 
and he extended an invitation to Belgium and other international “friends of the Congo” to 
support the newly independent nation in this effort (Lumumba 1958-1960). Belgium, however, 
sought to maintain a neocolonial relationship with its former colony. Belgium’s ideal Congo 
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differed markedly from Lumumba’s, and included regional divisions, positions of influence for 
stalwart colonial administrators, and puppet figures content to preserve Belgian interests and 
reject Congolese nationalism in favor of concessions from Brussels (De Witte 2001). In the 
weeks and months following independence, Belgian officials began to recognize that Patrice 
Lumumba did not fit into their neocolonial portrait of a liberated Congo. As 1960 neared a close, 
Brussels undertook to eliminate Congo’s independence hero, with the active support of the UN 
operation in the Congo (ONUC) and the United States Central Intelligence Agency, or CIA 
(Nzongola 2014b, De Witte 2001). 
 
1960-1964: Crisis in the Congo and ONUC Complicity 
ONUC provides insight into the UN’s philosophy of interaction with host states. In the 
midst of Congo’s post-independence political tumult, the United Nations chose repeatedly to 
intervene politically in the interests of Western member states-chiefly, Belgium and the United 
States-rather than to respect Congolese sovereignty (Fanon 1969, Lumumba 1961, De Witte 
2001). In early July 1960, Belgian General Janssens, then commander-in-chief of the Congolese 
military, pushed back against pressure from Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and members of 
the newly independent Congolese government to “Africanize” the military (Lumumba 1961, De 
Witte 2001). Famously, the General told Congolese troops in no uncertain terms that “Before 
Independence = After Independence” (Lumumba 1961, De Witte 2001). Janssens’ refusal to 
make post-independence concessions and his categorical mistreatment of Congolese troops 
incited a troop rebellion on July 5, 1960.  
In response to the mutiny, Belgium deployed troops to its former colony, occupying the 
mineral-rich territory of Katanga. On July 11, 1960, Moise Tshombe declared Katanga province 
independent, making himself its first president. Congolese and Belgian scholars depict Tshombe 
as a “puppet” of Brussels who played into the Belgian desire to sustain neocolonial influence in 
the Congo through a “divide and rule” strategy (Lumumba 1961, De Witte 2001). In response to 
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the crisis in Katanga, Prime Minister Lumumba appealed to the UN for support. In his tribute to 
Lumumba in Toward An African Revolution, independence activist and pan-Africanist Frantz 
Fanon cites this as Lumumba’s grand mistake (Fanon 1969). Lumumba intended for the UN to 
leverage its international legitimacy to stop Belgium’s attack on Congolese sovereignty. Instead, 
ONUC prolonged Belgian troop presence in Katanga in the name of “law and order” and later 
actively participated in Lumumba’s assassination and the Western-sponsored coup led by 
Colonel Joseph Desire Mobutu (Lumumba 1961, De Witte 2001, Nzongola 2014b, Nzongola 
2002).   
 
Kleptocracy and State Decline: Mobutu’s Congo 
Joseph Mobutu came to power in 1965, following several years of chaotic post-
independence political struggles and neocolonial schemes perpetrated by the UN, Belgium, and 
the United States (Lumumba 1961, De Witte 2001, Nzongola 2014b). At one time endorsed by 
the Congolese people for the semblance of stability he brought to the country, Mobutu’s 
popularity declined steadily from 1975, reaching a low point during the final seven years of his 
reign (1990-1997), as the ruler proved unable to survive the onslaught of political opposition 
that came with the country’s embrace of multi-party democracy. Scholars of Congolese history 
and politics accurately refer to Mobutu as a kleptocratic despot (Nzongola 2002).  
 In 1996, the Congolese government’s budget totaled $300 million US, an amount 
comparable to the budget of a single U.S. university (Nzongola 2002). Rather than fueling 
equitable development, infrastructure, and necessary social services such as education and 
healthcare, under Mobutu’s rule state resources served primarily to line the pockets of Mobutu 
and his inner circle of friends and relatives (Nzongola 2002). In fact, the term “kleptocracy” 
arose as a mechanism for describing financially predatory autocracies, in direct response to 
Mobutu’s reign, and estimates suggest that he stole $12 billion US in a period of 32 years (Haviv 
2015, Denny 2004). In Mobutu’s Congo, corruption and mediocrity remained normative 
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qualities among government personnel. Fearful of any credible threat to his rule, the kleptocrat 
routinely shuffled administrative posts and fired promising young officers from the state 
military. Additionally, during the despot’s three decades of rule, the state maintained no less 
than seven paramilitary organizations, each with blurred and often overlapping mandates. By 
pitting these forces against one another, Mobutu afforded his soldiers the capacity to silence 
dissent while ensuring that no one officer or unit could realistically challenge his rule. The 
security sector under Mobutu remained unfit to defend the nation, as opportunistic senior 
commanders frequently pocketed the salaries of rank-and-file soldiers. These lower-ranking 
personnel, desperate to earn a living, took to looting, raping, and extorting money from 
Congolese civilians (Nzongola 2002, Enough 2010, Evele 2015). In a climate of corruption and 
desperation, Mobutu’s rule sowed the seeds of state decay through systematically inhibiting the 
professionalization of the armed forces (Nzongola 2002, Enough 2010).  
Though Mobutu’s military strategy certainly limited the development of a professional 
Congolese defense force, the issues plaguing the nation’s military did not originate with 
President Mobutu. During the colonial era, King Leopold II created the Force Publique (FP) to 
seize control of Congolese territory and subjugate, enslave and oppress Congolese civilians 
(Hochschild 1998, De Witte 2001, Lumumba 1961). Forced conscription in the FP, in addition to 
other forms of forced labor, formed a pillar of Belgium’s colonial domination (Hochschild 1998, 
Lumumba 1961). Immediately following independence on June 30 1960, Belgian military 
officers attempted to forcibly retain their colonial-era power, sowing seeds of unrest that would 
usher in the UN’s first intervention in the Congo (Lumumba 1961, De Witte 2001). 
Throughout the Cold War period, Mobutu remained in the good graces of the United 
States; a reliable “strongman” far preferable to the less controllable, less predictable Prime 
Minister Patrice Lumumba (Lumumba 1961, Nzongola 2014b, De Witte 2001). U.S. officials 
perceived Lumumba’s staunch non-alignment philosophy as a threat to capitalism and 
democracy in Central and Southern Africa. The U.S. thus retained an interest in limiting the true 
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realization of democracy in eastern Congo and opted for the kleptocratic yet ideologically 
palatable rule of an ally over the nationalistic, “radical” sentiments of Congolese nationalists like 
Lumumba (Nzongola 2002, Stearns 2011, De Witte 2001, Lumumba 1961). 
 The withdrawal of U.S. financial and military bilateral aid to the Congo in 1990, 
corresponding to the fall of the Soviet Union and the thawing of Cold War bipolarity, left 
Mobutu bereft of international support and unable to sustain his institutionalized thievery. 
During the 1990s, public opinion fell to such a low that Mobutu could no longer walk freely in 
Kinshasa for fear of violent protest (Nzongola 2002). Internal political discontent offered 
Rwanda the perfect opportunity to violate the territorial sovereignty of the Congo.  
This section draws attention to Mobutu’s governance as a contributor to state weakness 
and is not an attempt to analytically chronicle his thirty-year rule. Nzongola-Ntalaja’s The 
Congo: From Leopold to Kabila: A People's History (2002) provides more informative analysis 
on the Mobutu presidency and its implications for the Congolese people. 
 
The 2 Congo Wars and International Intervention in DR Congo  
In 1994, Hutu extremist refugees, many former leaders within the Interhamwe and the 
FAR, began using camps in North and South Kivu to launch targeted attacks against the RPF 
regime in Rwanda. In the eyes of these genocidaires, the civil war with the RPF had yet to 
witness a conclusion and Rwanda would one day again be theirs (Stearns 2011, Nzongola 2014a, 
Bafilemba and Mueller 2013). The RPF, now at the helm of leadership in Kigali, sought to end 
these incursions by extremist Hutu refugees. The party identified Laurent Kabila, a longtime 
critic of the Mobutu regime, to be the Congolese face of the foreign-sponsored rebellion.  
In analyzing Congo’s two contemporary wars and the nation’s current political situation, 
I rely heavily on the work of Jason Stearns and Dr. Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja. Stearns, Congo 
analyst at New York University (NYU) and former MONUC employee, boasts over a decade of 
experience working in advocacy and research in eastern Congo. Dr. Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja is 
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a Congolese political scientist and scholar at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
(UNC-Chapel Hill) and has authored numerous books on the contemporary and historical 
underpinnings of conflict in the Congo.  
 In his analysis of the two Congo wars, Stearns (2011) dismisses Kabila as, in the 
eyes of the Congolese, an aging leader with Marxist sympathies whose plans for governance 
were out-of-touch with Congo’s realities. Nzongola and Stearns agree that Kabila’s fall from the 
graces of his international backers in Kigali and Kampala, and not the dissatisfaction of 
Congolese civilians, prompted the second Congo war (Nzongola 2006, Stearns 2011). 
Rwanda and Uganda spent a great deal of time attempting to convince Congolese citizens 
that a laundry list of foreign-sponsored rebel militias were in fact authentically Congolese. Over 
the course of the two Congo wars and the eleven years of unstable “peace” which followed the 
conclusion of the second Congo war in 2003, Rwanda maintained tutelage over several 
independent rebel militias in eastern Congo, including the Rassemblement Congolais pour la 
Democratie-Goma (RCD-G), the Congres National pour la Defense du Peuple (CNDP), and the 
Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23). Uganda’s proxies during this period included the Mouvement 
de Liberation du Congo (MLC), the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie-Kisangani 
(RCD-K), the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie-Mouvement de Liberation (RCD-
ML), and the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC). While Congolese citizens shared with these 
foreign invaders distaste for Mobutuist rule, in reality “Congolese liberation” and concerns over 
national security offered an attractive façade through which to disguise the economic plunder of 
eastern Congo (Nzongola 2014a, Stearns 2011, Committee on International Relations 2000). 
Between 1999 and 2000, several minor conflicts erupted within the Congo between Rwandan 
and Ugandan soldiers over access to the gold and diamond trade in Kisangani (Nzongola 2014, 
Stearns 2011).  
In a pan-African alliance led by Rwanda, foreign-sponsored rebels succeeded in toppling 
Mobutu in 1997. Laurent-Desire Kabila assumed control of DR Congo but lacked the popular 
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legitimacy to govern with authority. This propelled the leader into paranoia, and he began 
systematically disposing of his former Rwandan allies. Kigali was predictably indignant at this 
turn of events, and thus the second Congo war began in 1998. This conflict, again riddled with 
Rwandan and Ugandan proxies and their Western allies, would last for the next five years (BBC 
2014). The assassination of Laurent Kabila propelled his son, Joseph Kabila, to power, though 
again through an undemocratic and opaque process (Stearns 2011). In 2006, Kabila would go on 
to win the country’s first democratic elections since 1965. Western observers praised the 2006 
elections as success story for MONUC. This assessment notwithstanding, under Kabila’s rule 
peace and prosperity continue to evade the country (Nzongola 2014, Tull 2009).  
Tull (2009) explains that, as in other peacekeeping operations, MONUC personnel 
viewed the provision of free and fair elections as a foundational benchmark for peace. During 
the election period in 2006, the European Union provided 1,500 troops to assist MONUC in 
electoral monitoring. Tull cites the electoral process as a landmark achievement for MONUC, 
referencing only limited outbreaks of election-related violence and the registration of 25 million 
(out of an eligible 28 million) Congolese voters (Tull 2009). Tull’s categorization of the 2006 
process as a notable success for MONUC, ignores the fact that the political preferences of the 
Congolese electorate during this period in fact favored Jean-Pierre Bemba, a wealthy politician 
from Équateur province. Contrary to Congolese public opinion, Joseph Kabila triumphed in the 
2006 elections, an outcome suggestive of an imperfect electoral process (Stearns 2011). 
Both Rwanda and Uganda enjoyed preferential relationships with the West due to their 
cooperation with anti-terrorism initiatives and, in the case of Rwanda, due to the West’s 
“genocide guilt” (Nzongola 2014a, Beswick 2010, Reyntejens 2011, BBC 2014). Warm bilateral 
relations with the United States and other Western powers enabled the two Great Lakes nations 
to present the conflict as exclusively civil in nature and motivated by indigenous aspirations for 
democracy (Stearns 2011). Nzongola (2014a) refutes these claims in the context of Rwandan and 
Ugandan violations of Congolese sovereignty during both the first and second Congo wars. In so 
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doing, Nzongola irrefutably establishes the regional nature of Congo’s contemporary crisis. 
Rwanda and Uganda used Pan-Africanism, democratization, and security concerns in turn to 
justify armed intervention in the Congo, while the international community feigned ignorance 
and refused to abandon the “civil war” label for Congo’s dilemma (Nzongola 2002, Nzongola 
2014a, Stearns 2011).  Though the second war formally concluded in 2003, violence and 
instability continued even after the country’s groundbreaking democratic elections in 2006 (Tull 
2009).  
 
MONUC, MONUSCO and the FIB: UN Operations in DRC 
 The UN launched its Operation in the DR Congo (MONUC) in the midst of the second 
Congo war. The UNSC authorized the deployment of a limited number of military and civilian 
observers to the region in April 1999 (UNSC 1999). Nearly a year later, in February 2000, the 
Council authorized a peacekeeping force of 5,537, to include 500 military observers. Resolution 
1291 tasked MONUC with overseeing the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire agreement 
(UNSC 2000). In an analysis of UNSC resolutions from 1999 until 2005, Katarina Mansson 
reasons that the increasing latitude afforded to MONUC with (respect to the use of force) 
enabled peacekeeping troops to make substantial gains in the realm of civilian protection 
(Mansson 2006).  According to Mansson, this change in peacekeeping philosophy, as articulated 
through a progressively more robust succession of mandates, may be understood in the context 
of a focus shift within the UN whereby individual human rights gained unprecedented 
importance (Mansson 2006). In speaking on a panel hosted by the International Institute of 
Peace, representatives from the UN’s expert group on the Protection of Civilians (POC) reflect 
that the creation of the group enabled increased consistency, with respect to civilian protection, 
in the text of UN mandates. The group notes, however, that robust civilian protection measures, 
though consistent in UNSC resolutions, often lack practical force in implementation 
(International Institute of Peace 2014). 
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Mansson’s views and reports from UN experts echo the work of commissions such as the 
Brahimi commission and the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS), which argued for a new framework for peacekeeping centered on the rights of civilians 
(ICISS 2001). In her study “Use of force and civilian protection: peace operations in Congo” 
Mansson writes in reference to the evolution of MONUC’s mandates that they “suggest that the 
UN is inclined to broaden the concept of the use of force when facing a deteriorating human 
rights situation” (Mansson 2006 p. 3). Mansson points out subtle changes in mandate language 
during the period 1999-2005 which implies an increased willingness on the part of the UNSC to 
lower the threshold for the use of force on behalf of civilians (Mansson 2006). While Resolution 
1291 (2000) stipulates that the UN “may take necessary action to protect civilians under 
imminent threat of physical violence (UNSC 2000, emphasis added), UNSC Resolution 1565 
(2004) mandated the force to “ensure the protection of civilians, including humanitarian 
personnel, under imminent threat from physical violence” and afforded troops the freedom to 
use all means necessary to carry out this objective (UNSC 2004). Mansson argues that such 
subtle language differences convey a reduction in hesitancy on the part of the UNSC to authorize 
more offensively robust missions. This assertiveness, she concludes, stems from an increased 
concern for human rights in countries that host UN forces (Mansson). 
 While I agree with the author’s assertion that the rhetoric of UNSC mandates 
pertaining to the DRC is observably more robust than at the time of the mission’s establishment, 
I contest the rather linear nature through which she characterizes this evolution. Though it is 
true that MONUSCO’s 2013 mandate conveys a much more robust strategy for peacekeeping 
troops in the DRC, UNSC resolutions over this period did not continually become more assertive 
or more attentive to human rights but rather oscillated in response to developments in the DR 
Congo and to international political pressure (Nzongola 2014a). For example, the failure of 
MONUC troops to protect civilians in Bukavu, DRC during violent clashes between Rally for 
Congolese Democracy-Goma (RCD-G) troops and pro-government belligerents caused several 
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international human rights NGOs to call for a review of MONUC’s mandate. Mounting 
international pressure and anti-UN demonstrations in Bukavu prompted the UNSC to rethink 
its strategy for civilian protection (Mansson 2006). Interview data, shedding light on the 
shortcomings of MONUSCO in its current form, likewise weaken the assertion that UN 
operations in Congo progress linearly toward a perfectible ideal. 
 
From MONUC to MONUSCO and the FIB: The UN in the DR Congo Today 
MONUSCO’s current mandate, issued in 2013, diverges from standard UN operating 
procedures in creating a 3,000-troop Force Intervention Brigade (FIB). According to Resolution 
2098, the brigade may actively target armed groups in the DRC that continue to contribute to 
regional instability and the endangerment of civilians (UNSC 2013). Where previous mandates 
allow UN troops to act forcefully on behalf of civilians in imminent danger, this resolution 
allows the UN to take initiative in preventing human rights abuses before they occur. 
 MONUC operated in DR Congo from 1999 until 2010, when the UN reauthorized 
the force under a new name: the UN Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo (MONUSCO). On 
two occasions during this eleven-year period, supplementary forces augmented UN operations 
in the region (Maphosa 2013). In 2003, the European Union (EU) initiated Operation Artemis 
to respond to escalating violence in the Ituri district of eastern Congo. Deployed independently 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the operation was the first of its kind 
(Mansson 2006). The EU intervened in the Congo again in 2006 to reinforce regional security 
before and after the 2006 presidential elections (Maphosa 2013, Tull 2009).  
 As indicated above,  MONUC became MONUSCO in 2010. In establishing the 
new mission, the UNSC tasked MONUSCO troops with electoral assistance (at the request of the 
Congolese government), civilian protection, and the enforcement of an arms embargo (UNSC 
2010). Resolution 2098 (2013) retained many of these objectives. This succeeding resolution 
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differed from its predecessor chiefly in its creation of a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) and the 
allowance for drone surveillance capacity (UNSC 2013). 
 
Evaluating the FIB  
 In November 2013, military pressure from the UN and Congolese forces (FARDC) forced 
the March-23 (M-23) militia to surrender. The rebels agreed to lay down arms and pursue all 
future negotiations through purely political means (Maphosa 2013). Writing in a policy brief for 
the Africa Institute of South Africa, Sylvester Maphosa applauds the defeat of the M-23 and the 
militia’s commitment to peaceful negotiations as a “step in the right direction” (Maphosa 2013). 
The author views the M-23’s commitment as promising in that it extends beyond negatively-
focused conflict resolution (stopping conflict and violence). Negotiations with the M-23 and 
frameworks such as the Peace and Security Framework of February 2013, an agreement between 
the UN, the African Union (AU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and 
the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), are laudable steps toward 
creating a positive peace. Maphosa characterizes positive peace as a dynamic in which parties 
not only abstain from violence but also commit to work together to create a peaceful community 
(Maphosa 2013).  
 Though he applauds M-23 negotiations as a benchmark on the path to positive peace, 
Maphosa also recognizes that proclamations of success must be undertaken with caution, citing 
the over 40 armed groups that remain active in DR Congo (Maphosa 2013). Maphosa reasons 
that the greatest obstacle to ensuring security and stability in eastern DRC today lies in the 
Congolese state’s inability to police the country’s vast, sparsely populated eastern regions. He 
remains hopeful, however, that increased engagement from the state, the international 
community, and Congolese civil society may translate into tangible security gains (Maphosa 
2013). 
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Drone Surveillance and MONUSCO: A New Horizon for Peacekeeping 
 In addition to the creation of an explicitly offensive troop component, UNSC resolution 
2098 permits MONUSCO to use drone technology to monitor Congo’s eastern provinces for the 
purposes of protecting civilians in the region. MONUSCO is the first UN force authorized to use 
drone technology in any capacity (Karlsrud and Rosen 2013). In an article entitled “In the Eye of 
the Beholder,” Karlsrud and Rosen (2013) provide an analysis of the efficacy of the new 
technology and the ethical dilemmas it presents. While the authors acknowledge that 
MONUSCO is a problematic prototype for a drone-capable peacekeeping force, the authors 
develop a generally positive evaluation of the use of such technology in modern peacekeeping. 
Karlsrud and Rosen cite geographical complexity as the primary obstacle to effective 
surveillance in eastern DRC, a factor only partially mitigated by drone surveillance. The authors 
concede, however, that drone surveillance offers a far superior solution to this dilemma than any 
other available surveillance option. Of critical importance, Karlsrud and Rosen contest that 
while human rights activists today on the whole seem to campaign against the use of drone 
technology, these same organizations will soon advocate for the use of such technology in 
peacekeeping missions worldwide. If the technology enhances mission capacity to protect 
civilians and to identify and persecute human rights abusers, the authors argue, the 
international community must conclude that the omission of drone capacity in peacekeeping 
mandates does a disservice to civilian populations (Karlsrud and Rosen 2013). 
 An in-depth overview of MONUSCO’s use of drone technology remains outside the scope 
of this study. Within the confines of this analysis, I refer to MONUSCO’s use of drone technology 
as a feature of the mission’s enhanced legal authority to employ force against armed militias and 
on behalf of armed groups. In interviews with Congolese civilians and UN staff in June and July 
of 2014, no interview participant raised the issue of MONUSCO’s use of drone technology.  
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Peacekeeping in Practice: Theories of Evaluation 
 The case-specific realities of conflict in eastern DRC and the evolution of R2P as a 
peacekeeping norm created a novel dilemma for the preservation of peace and security in the 
Great Lakes region. The UN faces an unprecedented dilemma in achieving success in DR Congo. 
But how is such success to be evaluated? 
 I have, to this point, briefly addressed analyses of the efficacy of MONUSCO and the FIB. 
In conclusion, I will present several frameworks contained in the literature through which to 
measure the impact of international peacekeeping forces. In doing so, I will briefly describe my 
own frameworks for evaluation and explain the ways in which my methods build upon existing 
theory. 
 In An Agenda for Peace (1992), Boutros Boutros-Ghali identifies three components 
necessary for effective peacekeeping: material and political support from the international 
community, cooperation with local authorities, and clearly defined mandates (Boutros-Ghali 
1992). In a study assessing the success of UN missions from 1988-1996, Duane Bratt offers four 
dimensions on which to measure peacekeeping success: mandate implementation, conflict 
resolution, conflict containment, and casualty prevention. She then classifies the UN’s 28 
operations during the period 1988-1996 each as a failure, a moderate success, or a complete 
success (Bratt 1996). 
 Bratt’s approach to evaluation allows for a more comprehensive assessment of each UN 
mission, one that is more throughout than analysis using any one of her criteria in isolation. 
Bratt reasons that mandate implementation alone is not a sufficient measure of mission success, 
given that the UNSC and its member states often have incentives to set artificially limited or, 
conversely, impractical and overreaching mandates (Bratt 1996). Conflict resolution as an 
isolated measure is problematic in that the resolution of conflict depends on a host of factors, 
many of which lie outside the control of the UN. The chief limitation of the conflict containment 
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measure, in contrast, is that some conflicts pose little potential for regional escalation, rendering 
this measure largely irrelevant.  
The “limiting casualties” measure attempts to ascertain whether the presence of a UN 
force limited (rather than contributing to the increase of or having no impact on) the number of 
conflict-related civilian deaths. The principle limitation of this criterion is that it implies a 
counterfactual: it is impossible to accurately assess the death toll in an alternate reality in which 
no peacekeeping force is present (Bratt 1996). Taken together, however, these measures provide 
a mechanism through which to reach a comprehensive assessment of peacekeeping success. 
 
Evaluating MONUSCO  
 My research evaluates MONUSCO on one component of its mandate: the use of all 
means necessary to protect civilians (UNSC 2013). As such, I will use two of Bratt’s measures to 
assess MONUSCO’s impact on civilian populations in eastern DRC: casualty prevention and 
mandate implementation. I choose here to use mandate implementation given that 
MONUSCO’s 2013 mandate is intentionally robust with regard to civilian protection. Of critical 
importance to my investigation, therefore, are items a and b of MONUSCO’s mandate contained 
in UNSC resolution 2098. These items lay out civilian protection as a key priority for 
MONUSCO and provide the legal basis for the establishment of a Force Intervention Brigade. 
My analysis seeks to build upon that of Bratt’s by including the perspectives of Congolese 
civilians and UN personnel when evaluating MONUSCO’s impact on civilian populations in 
eastern DR Congo. In analyzing these perspectives, I construct a model for MONUSCO’s 
limitations based upon Bratt’s criteria: the inability of the mission to protect civilians, as 
contained in its mandate, and to prevent civilian casualties.  
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Chapter III: MONUSCO’s Internal Limitations 
In light of MONUSCO’s landmark mandates contained in Resolution 2098 and 2147, this 
study examines the mission’s effectiveness at protecting civilians in eastern Congo, as measured 
in June and July of 2014. It is the objective of this study to determine under what conditions the 
mission may prove effective at preventing civilian casualties. I argue that, despite change in the 
text of the mission’s mandate, as evidenced by Resolutions 2098 and 2147, the conditions for 
mission success are not yet fully present in eastern DRC. For the purposes of this study, I will 
use “mission success” to mean the limitation of civilian casualties and attacks against civilians. 
In my analysis, I focus on Bratt’s (1996) “casualty prevention” criterion as a yardstick for 
mission efficacy. It may be noted, however, that as “protection of civilians” features prominently 
in MONUSCO’s current mandate, there exists some overlap in analysis with Bratt’s “mandate 
implementation” criterion (UNSC 2013, UNSC 2014, Bratt 1996). 
As stated above, this study finds that conditions for mission success do not yet exist in 
the context of MONUSCO’s operations in eastern DRC. I argue that MONUSCO does not meet 
sufficient conditions for success on two dimensions. First, internal shortcomings limit 
MONUSCO’s capacity to protect Congolese civilians. These shortcomings include intervention 
capacity, geographic mismatch between the epicenter of the conflict and the distribution of 
MONUSCO personnel, and troop skill-level disparities. Second, problems with host-country 
collaboration limit MONUSCO’s ability to fulfill the civilian protection components of its 
mandate. These problems include emphasizing government input over that of Congolese 
community members, the weakness of the Congolese security sector, tensions between UN 
civilian and military staff, and the short-term nature of MONUSCO troop placements. In this 
chapter, I address MONUSCO’s internal failings. Chapter 4 provides an analysis of limiting 
factors arising from the way that the mission currently collaborates with host-country actors. 
Qualitative data contained in this study provides explanation for each of the causal 
factors listed above as limitations to MONUSCO success. However, before engaging in a deeper 
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analysis of the necessary conditions for the mission’s success and the lack of these conditions 
today in eastern Congo, I must first establish that UN forces are currently unsuccessful at 
protecting civilians in eastern DRC. Much was made in the media of the defeat of the M-23 
militia group in the fall of 2013 (Aljazeera 2013, BBC 2013, UN News Centre 2013).  By the end 
of 2013, over 4,000 former combatants in North and South Kivu had surrendered, ushering in 
an era of optimism in eastern Congo (Oxfam 2014).  
Other accounts suggest that such optimism may be premature. In a survey of rural 
communities in North and South Kivu, DRC from August-December 2013, Oxfam International 
documents that many villages remain under the control of armed groups and the majority of 
Congolese civilians in these regions feel that their security did not increase significantly 
following the defeat of the M-23 (Oxfam 2014). In many villages in South Kivu, this is due to the 
fact that armed groups in this province retain few if any ties to the M-23 rebels, who operated 
primarily in North Kivu province. Thus, civilians in South Kivu did not accrue any significant 
security gains from the M-23’s defeat (Oxfam 2014). In North Kivu, many residents reported an 
increase in attacks and abuses during the M-23’s decline, as armed groups anticipated upcoming 
MONUSCO offensives. Militias were aware that, following the M-23’s defeat, MONUSCO would 
turn its attention to neutralizing other armed groups in eastern Congo. Data from Oxfam 
suggests that these groups increased their harassment of civilians during this period, in 
anticipation of MONUSCO’s imminent offensive (Oxfam 2014). Rural Congolese civilians in 
both provinces report ongoing instances of sexual violence, looting, beatings, murders, and 
forced taxation. Locals refer to illegal taxes imposed by armed groups as “pay for your life” or 
“sleep in peace” taxes, alluding to the consequences of noncompliance (Oxfam 2014 p. 8).  
Oxfam’s 2014 report suggests that the M-23’s defeat did not systemically restore stability 
to rural civilians in eastern Congo, many of whom live daily under the threat of violence from 
armed groups (Oxfam 2014). It bears repeating that over thirty armed groups operate in eastern 
Congo, in addition to the M-23 (Maphosa 2013). Two of the largest contributors to 
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contemporary insecurity in eastern Congo are the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the 
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). Here, I address the impact of these 
groups on civilian populations in eastern Congo. 
 MONUSCO estimates that 2,000 FDLR combatants remain active in eastern DRC 
(MONUSCO 2014). Congolese news source Radio Okapi puts the number at 1,500 as of late 
September 2014 (Radio Okapi 2014b). As the group’s title implies, its founding philosophy 
hinged on the overthrow of the Rwandan government. Today, however, the group lacks the 
capacity to launch any credible attack on the Rwandan state. The FDLR is perhaps best known 
for crimes committed in Rwanda during the country’s 100-day genocide in 1994 (MONUSCO 
2014). Following the genocide, FDLR combatants fled into DR Congo, formerly Zaire. In the two 
decades that followed, FDLR troops bore substantial responsibility for attacks against civilian 
populations in the DRC, including killings, looting, and sexual assault (Nzongola 2014a). 
 At the time of this writing, the UN is currently promoting a program for the voluntary 
repatriation of FDLR militants. At a joint meeting between the ICGLR and SADC on July 2, 
2014, participating governments established a six-month timeframe for FDLR repatriation. On 
October 2, 2014, marking the halfway point in the repatriation process, the UN Security Council 
released a press statement expressing concern about delays in FDLR surrender and repatriation. 
Congolese civil society likewise continues to express frustration regarding the process, which 
many perceive as unbearably slow (UN News Centre 2014, Radio Okapi 2014c). 
 In addition to the FDLR, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a Ugandan rebel group, 
remains a threat in North Kivu province. A series of news articles from Radio Okapi, a 
Kinshasa-based Congolese news source, detail murders, beatings, kidnappings, and 
displacement resulting from a series of ADF-sponsored attacks in towns and villages in North 
Kivu (Radio Okapi 2014c). MONUSCO allegedly forced an ADF retreat into Uganda in the 
spring of 2014, but recent developments suggest that the group remains active in eastern Congo 
(Radio Okapi 2014c). 
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 As Maphosa (2013) suggests, threats to civilians by armed groups in eastern Congo are 
not limited to the M-23, the FDLR, or the ADF. These armed groups, in addition to being “major 
players” in the perpetuation of violence against civilians, serve as examples that illustrate that 
success, when defined in terms of civilian protection, remains elusive for MONUSCO. These 
illustrations are particularly potent given that for each of the armed groups mentioned, 
MONUSCO undertook initiatives to explicitly target the group and, in the case of the M-23 and 
the ADF, achieved at least some success (Oxfam 2014, Radio Okapi 2014c, BBC 2013, Aljazeera 
2013). As the Oxfam survey (2014) suggests, a variety of armed militias outside those mentioned 
here continue to impact civilian security in eastern Congo, and particularly in South Kivu 
province (Oxfam 2014). Thus, far from a comprehensive portrait of the current security dynamic 
in eastern Congo, this analysis of the M-23, ADF, and FLDR provides merely a window into the 
security situation in the DRC, suggesting that success for MONUSCO is not yet within reach. 
 
From Brahimi to MONUSCO:  Challenges Remain 
In 2000, UN-Secretary General Kofi Annan commissioned a comprehensive evaluation 
of UN peacekeeping operations. The report came in response to widespread criticism of UN 
failures during the 1990s in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda. Compiled by former Algerian Foreign 
Minister Brahimi, the “Brahimi Report” identifies key shortcomings that contributed to UN 
failure in the late 20th century. These shortcomings included several factors explicitly internal 
to the United Nations: outdated technology, skill-level deficits and a lack of uniformity in skill 
level among UN staff, and the inability of UN troops to deploy and react quickly in response to 
crises (Brahimi 2000). 
UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2098 (March 2013) attempts to rectify two of 
the shortcomings contained in the Brahimi report (UNSC 2013). These include technological 
capacity and rapid-deployment capacity. By authorizing the use of unmanned aerial vehicle 
technology (UAVs or “drones”) and the creation of an offensive rapid-deployment force, the 
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Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), UNSC Resolution 2098 aims to enhance MONUSCO’s 
capacity to protect civilians (UNSC 2013, Karlsrud and Rosen 2013, Maphosa 2013, Oakford 
2014). The UN reauthorized these two components a year later in UNSC Resolution 2147 (UNSC 
2014). Despite these attempts to enhance MONUSCO force capability, I present evidence that 
suggests that MONUSCO’s internal capacity remains insufficient to effectively protect civilians 
in eastern Congo. Eight interviews with current and former UN personnel provide the majority 
of data for analyzing the UN’s internal capacity shortcomings, though community interviews 
provide insight on select factors, notably in clarifying MONUSCO’s capacity to rapidly respond 
to crises. 
This study finds fault with MONUSCO’s current operations along three internal 
dimensions: lack of uniform intervention standards, a geographic mismatch relative to physical 
geography, and troop-quality shortcomings. I analyze MONUSCO’s civilian protection capacity 
as observed in June and July 2014, 15 months after the UNSC adopted Resolution 2098. 
Understanding the realities of bureaucratic inertia and the complexities of peacekeeping 
operations, I do not use full mandate implementation or 100% prevention of civilian casualties 
as the standard by which to judge MONUSCO. Instead, I base assessments on the reports of UN 
staff and Congolese community members. If changes contained in Resolution 2098 in fact 
enable MONUSCO to more effectively protect civilians, one might expect positive interview 
responses from study subjects. 
Neither community members nor UN personnel identified “lack of resources” as a 
contributing factor to MONUSCO ineffectiveness. To this end, MONUSCO resources such as 
troop levels and organization budget are not areas of concern in this study. One UN team leader 
of interpreters, stated in an interview: 
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“MONUSCO has sufficient resources. The problem is that they do not 
listen to civil society recommendations.” (UN Interpreter, interview, July 
2014) 
 
“To be honest, they have everything they need to stop war. The Pakistani 
soldiers took us to their camp and they showed us all of the supplies that 
they have- their weapons, their security cameras, etc. What they do not 
have is the will to intervene. If they decide to make peace, they are able to 
make peace.” (Congolese Community Member, interview, June 2014) 
 
 While the interpreter and community member quoted above offer different explanations 
for the UN’s failure in Congo, both insist that a lack of resources does not contribute 
significantly to this failure. With an annual budget of 1,398,475,300 USD and a troop contingent 
of over 19,000 peacekeepers, I am inclined to agree with the opinions cited above. MONUSCO 
remains the largest and most expensive UN force on record (MONUSCO at a Glance 2014). Of 
the 16 current UN peacekeeping operations, only two other forces-the United Nations Mission in 
South Sudan (UNMISS) and the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur 
(UNAMID)-boast a budget of over US $1 billion. MONUSCO’s budget exceeds that of the UN’s 
next most expensive mission, UNAMID, by nearly US $250 million. The average 2015 budget for 
a current UN mission, according to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), is 
479,647,649- less than half MONUSCO’s 2015 budget (United Nations Peacekeeping 2015).  
 UN peacekeeping operations receive funding from institutionalized treaty obligations, 
under which the U.S. provides 28.4% of the peacekeeping budget. This annual funding is 
automatic and allocated to specifically designated peacekeeping operations. It is prudent to 
note, however, that while the Department of Peacekeeping (DPKO) receives automatic funding 
annually, other crucial UN components gather funding through ad-hoc mechanisms. These 
components represent UN bodies that carry out crucial social functions in tandem with a 
peacekeeping mission in conflict areas, including the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the 
UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and civil 
society engagement (Power 2015). 
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The geography of eastern Congo is complex and often unforgiving. At 2,344,858 square 
kilometers, the DR Congo is the largest country in sub-Saharan Africa and the 11th largest 
country in the world. Nearly two-thirds of Congolese civilians live in remote rural areas, and 
dense vegetation in the DRC’s eastern provinces often provides shelter for armed groups (CIA 
World Factbook 2014). Given these realities, it comes as no surprise that MONUSCO demands a 
large share of UN peacekeeping resources. MONUSCO possesses adequate resources, financially 
and in manpower, to meet the demands of a challenging peacekeeping environment. The 
explanation for the mission’s shortcomings, it appears, must be found elsewhere.  
 
MONUSCO: Uniformity in Intervention 
While most concede that MONUSCO troops serve at minimum as deterrent or 
preventative agents, UN staff and community interview participants unanimously agree that 
MONUSCO in its current state is poorly equipped to respond to crises or actively intervene on 
behalf of civilian populations. Given this consideration, I shift focus to what I will term 
“uniformity in intervention capacity.” In my conversations with UN staff and Congolese 
community members in South Kivu, the many respondents pointed to issues of the “will to 
protect” among UN troops as an area of concern.  In contrast, other UN staffs attribute 
MONUSCO’s limited ability to protect civilians in South Kivu more to a lack of understanding of 
the meaning of “civilian protection” rather than unwillingness to protect civilians. These 
personnel cite variation in human rights norms-and in the internalization of those norms- 
between nations as an obstacle to mandate execution.  One former UN employee, a Swedish 
professional and member of a joint civilian-police human rights monitoring team, described the 
problem in mandate internalization through the following example:  
“When we went out to the field, we would always get updates from peacekeepers 
on the security situation. We would ask what they were doing to protect the 
civilian population. A common answer was,  ‘We do patrols on market days.’  
They would go in the car and patrol the market on specific days. To my 
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understanding, this was not civilian protection. There is more to civilian 
protection than that.” (UN Civilian Observer, interview, July 2014). 
 
 The monitor went on to attribute this apparent discrepancy to a lack of understanding on 
the part of UN peacekeepers, rather than a lack of will. Both UN Civilian police observers noted 
that following the implementation of Resolution 2098 in spring 2013, the UN began to take 
concrete steps to sensitize peacekeeping troops in accordance with international human rights 
norms regarding the protection of individual citizens. A full description on the nature and 
historical development of these norms may be found in Chapter 2. One MONUSCO-sponsored 
troop training series initiated in the fall of 2014 aims to sensitize peace keepers to the unique 
human rights dilemmas faced by women and girls in conflict situations (Padovan 2014). This 
program presents evidence of progress in establishing and uniformly disseminating human 
rights standards. However, given the absence of evidence to suggest the presence of any 
uniform, objective conditions to necessitate intervention, I maintain that systematizing such 
standards must remain a priority for MONUSCO. 
 Congolese community members and Congolese UN staff, in contrast, tended to cite lack 
of troop resolve as a major obstacle to MONUSCO’s success. One local leader in Kalehe said, 
“The UN lives in the best places. Compared to where civilians are living, they live 
much more comfortably. They do not seem to care about development or 
protecting civilians. When they leave, we wonder what we will have to remember 
them by, because up to this time they have done nothing.” (Congolese 
Community Member, interview, June 2014). 
 
 His peers echoed this concern: 
“Often we see situations in which people are fighting near UN troops and the 
troops do not intervene.” (Congolese Community Member, interview, June 2014). 
 
“They do not go to the places where people are fighting. They do not go into the 
bush.” (Congolese Community  Member, interview, June 2014). 
 
 The assessments of these community members reflect broad consensus regarding the 
UN’s failure to intervene on behalf of Congolese civilians. Some attributed the failure to the 
UN’s hesitance to consult local leaders, suggesting that a breakdown in communication limits 
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the UN’s capacity to identify and respond to rural atrocities (Congolese Community Member, 
Interview, June 2014). Others identified a problem of will, noting that UN troops lacked the will 
to operate in areas “without access to running water” and that they preferred to live “like 
tourists” in larger towns and village centers (UN Interpreter, Interview, July 2014; Congolese 
Community Member, Interview, June 2014).  
  In the next section, I highlight the geographic mismatch in MONUSCO personnel 
placement that explains a comparative lack of UN presence in remote rural areas, as one leader 
above mentioned in referring to “the bush.” On the whole, I agree with respondents in 
concluding that practical intervention by the UN often falls short of the text of Resolutions 2098 
and 2147, which require the proactive protection of civilians. Interviews with UN personnel 
suggest a discrepancy between the text of Resolutions 2098 and 2147 and the steps that UN 
peacekeepers feel are adequate to “protect civilians” using “all means necessary,” with tangible 
action on the ground often falling short of the robust rhetoric contained in the security council 
resolutions (UNSC 2013; UNSC 2014;  UN Civilian Observer, Interview, July 2014). Practically, 
the comparative lack of violent instability in major cities such as Goma and Bukavu alludes to 
the UN’s failure to effectively police rural conflicts (Oxfam 2014). 
Where community members in Kalehe harshly criticized the UN for its failure to 
intervene on behalf of civilian populations, a failure these individuals attributed largely to 
indifference, UN staff offered more generous assessments of the apparent non-intervention of 
MONUSCO troops.  However, whether interview respondents explained this reality by criticizing 
lack of troop willpower or commitment, a lack of consensus regarding the meaning and 
implications of “civilian protection,” or the inherent limitations of multinational security forces, 
all agreed that the situation on the ground in eastern Congo to date falls short of the aggressive 
language found in UNSC Resolution 2098 and its successor, Resolution 2147 (UNSC 2013, 
UNSC 2014). The resolutions authorize MONUSCO to use all means necessary to protect 
civilians, as well as to offensively target illicit militias. As one Congolese UN official responded,  
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“The text of the mandate is fine. Unfortunately, the translation of the text into 
practical action on the ground does not match.” (UN Interpreter, interview, July 
2014). 
 
The UN interpreter quoted above served as a lead interpreter for UN peacekeeping 
troops in as they conducted training exercises with FARDC troops. His comments reflect 
majority consensus among interview respondents. No interview participant elected to dispute 
the validity of Resolutions 2098 or 2147. In other words, interview respondents agreed that the 
new text of these resolutions, in granting MONUSCO greater freedom and authority to use all 
means necessary to protect civilians, represented positive progress for the mission. While a few 
UN personnel conceded practical progress on the ground, even those who identified observable 
progress since the enactment of Resolutions 2098 and 2147 recognized that such progress did 
not come at a pace sufficient to meet the needs of Congolese civilians.  
All respondents recognized that in order to protect civilians in a manner consistent with 
the mission’s mandate, intervention must become more robust. To this end, MONUSCO should 
establish clear guidelines for intervention, including an institutionalized, concrete, and universal 
set of conditions requiring action on the part of MONUSCO. Such a system would require 
MONUSCO to respond after given conditions were met and would impose penalties for troops 
who failed to intervene under the specified conditions. This system would do much to remedy 
the ambiguity of terms such as “civilian protection” and “all means necessary” contained in the 
mission’s mandate (UNSC 2013, 2014). 
  A reluctance on the part of troops to intervene, leaving aside the reasons behind the 
reluctance, remains a major obstacle to the implementation of Resolution 2147 and, thus, to the 
effective protection of civilians in eastern DRC.   
 
MONUSCO’s Geographic Mismatch: East vs. West, Rural vs. Urban 
 Nearly all UN staff interviewed referenced the vast, complex terrain of the DRC, and the 
often-unreliable transportation infrastructure, as major obstacles to MONUSCO success in 
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eastern Congo. As referenced in the introduction to this chapter, the DRC ranks first in sub-
Saharan Africa in terms of land area, and about 66% of its population is rural. This vast and 
disperse geographic landscape, coupled with the densely forested and mountainous terrain of 
the nation’s east, present logistical dilemmas for UN peacekeepers (CIA World Factbook 2014).  
 Proponents of MONUSCO’s drone surveillance technology cite the technology’s ability to 
facilitate observation in the context of complex geography as justification for the technology’s 
continued use (Oakford 2014). Karlsrud and Rosen (2013) list the capacity to overcome 
geographic complexity as a merit of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) or drone technology in the 
context of the Congo, claiming that the use of drones in eastern Congo poses the potential to 
greatly enhance the mission’s capacity to monitor armed groups and to detect and prevent 
attacks against civilians and other human rights abuses (Karlsrud and Rosen 2013). 
Other analyses of the conflict additionally point to geography as an inhibitor to mission 
success in Congo (Tull 2009). The complex geography of the DRC presents a contrapositive 
scenario, whereby it is impossible to assess the success of a hypothetically identical mission 
operating in an identical political environment but on more welcoming terrain. Such an 
argument remains outside the scope of this study.  
Here, I attribute MONUSCO’s failure to protect civilians not to geographic obstacles to 
themselves but to the ways in which the mission’s organization further hinders success given 
this challenging physical environment. I analyze the mission’s organization in terms of troop 
presence along two dimensions: East versus West, on one dimension, and rural versus urban, on 
the second. I conclude that MONUSCO currently operates below optimal capacity given 
disproportionate troop presence in the western part of the country and in urban areas, relative 
to the needs of the Congolese population and threats posed to civilians. Only one-third of 
Congolese civilians live in cities, and in today’s Congo, armed groups operate at far higher 
frequencies in rural areas (Oxfam 2014, CIA World Factbook 2014).  
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 Evidence from the previous section alludes to the lack of UN presence in some of South 
Kivu’s rural villages, conceptualized at times by respondents as “the bush.” a Swedish civilian 
police observer notes here that MONUSCO presence in rural localities is often confined to town 
centers and marketplaces, areas seldom populated by illicit militia groups. One Congolese UN 
interpreter reasons that the dearth of MONUSCO troops in rural Congo may be explained by a 
desire for personal comfort on the part of peacekeepers: 
“MONUSCO should go to places where atrocities are actually occurring, rather 
than remaining in town centers. They remain in the center of town because it is 
easier to access water there.” (UN Interpreter, interview, July 2014). 
 
 While I do not dispute the importance of personal comfort as a motivator inspiring 
MONUSCO’s disproportionate urban presence, I argue that the mission’s organization plays a 
more crucial role in contributing to the discrepancy between the location of militia activity-
overwhelmingly rural- and the concentration of troops-disproportionately urban. Here, I use 
“organization” to mean the geographic distribution of peacekeeping troops and other 
MONUSCO personnel. Map 1.1  in the Appendix displays the geographic distribution of armed 
militias currently operating in the DR Congo. It must be noted that armed group activity 
remains limited to the Congolese provinces of Orientale, North and South Kivu, and to a lesser 
extent, Katanga. Each of these provinces lines the eastern edge of the DRC. Additionally, with 
the exception of the Kata-Katanga armed group in Lubumbashi, Katanga province, no armed 
groups operate in provincial capitals, and the majority of armed groups reside outside major 
cities. Even in Katanga, armed groups remain concentrated in rural areas while launching only 
sporadic attacks on major cities like Lubumbashi (MONUSCO at a Glance 2014). 
 The MONUSCO’s DR Congo headquarters are located in Kinshasa, the country’s capital 
city, about 1,500 miles from the capitals of North and South Kivu in eastern Congo. This is 
significant, given that the country’s eastern provinces harbor greater levels of instability. During 
the two Congo wars, from 1998-2003, Kinshasa itself underwent periods of conflict and 
occupation by foreign militants (Stearns 2011, Nzongola 2002). However, in the years since the 
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war’s formal conclusion, relative peace returned to Kinshasa. Epochs of conflict during the 
2003-2014 period erupted not in the nation’s capital but in its mineral-rich eastern provinces.  
 The 1,5000-mile distance alone does not do enough to convey the inherent shortcomings 
of MONUSCO’s “home base” location. The country’s east is accessible by way of Kinshasa only 
through air travel, and only on a singular national airline. Road travel incurs delays due to 
difficult terrain and unreliable roads, and cross-country automobile excursions may take 
months. In an analysis of the DR Congo, Foster and Benitez  (2011) find that due to years of 
conflict, dense forests, and low population densities in much of the country, the DRC has 
perhaps the worst transportation infrastructure in the world (Foster and Benitez 2011). This 
reality serves to illuminate the impracticality of a MONUSCO headquarters located so far from 
the foci of the conflict in Congo.  
 It must be noted that although the MONUSCO headquarters retains offices in Kinshasa, 
MONUSCO’s civilian commander, Martin Kobler, resides in Goma, North Kivu province, in the 
eastern part of the country.  MONUSCO provincial headquarters operate in each of DR Congo’s 
provinces, including North and South Kivu (MONUSCO 2014).  Over the course of my research, 
I visited MONUSCO’s South Kivu provincial headquarters in Bukavu, DRC. MONUSCO’s 
geographic organization within the Congo includes a mission headquarters in the capital city 
and smaller headquarters in each of the country’s ten provinces. I contest the practicality of this 
model for two reasons. 
 First, as described above, the location of the mission’s overall headquarters places the 
office far from the source of conflict in the east. In an interview conducted in July 2014, one UN 
Political Officer cited the geographic distance as an obstacle to mission communication and 
information gathering (UN Political Officer, interview, July 2014). Second, until recently, the 
concentration of UN staff in the western part of the country remained disproportionately large 
to the extent that operations in the eastern part of the country suffered as a result. Map 1.1  in 
the Appendix displays the distribution of UN headquarters and peacekeeping camps throughout 
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the DR Congo. Of note, a disproportionate concentration of leadership offices is found in 
Kinshasa, the capital city in the far west of the country. These include the MONUSCO 
headquarters, the MONUSCO force headquarters, the UN Police (UNPOL) headquarters, and 
the MONUSCO logistics base. In contrast, these offices are not found in North and South Kivu, 
the provinces with the highest current concentrations of armed militias (MONUSCO at a Glance 
2014). 
 During an interview with George, a Senegalese UN officer in MONUSCO’s political 
affairs department, I learned that a shift in mission organization began in May 2014. According 
to George, most of MONUSCO’s operational staff now resides in Goma, North Kivu, DRC. The 
majority of division heads transferred to Goma during the spring and summer of 2014 as well, 
and George added that MONUSCO plans to continue this shift in the months to come.  Speaking 
on behalf of the South Kivu headquarters, George stated that the influx of new staff enables 
MONUSCO troops to deploy deeper into the field, expanding troop presence in rural areas. 
 One UN interpreter further substantiates George’s assessment of the mission’s increased 
capacity to operate in more remote areas, citing an increased UN presence in villages such as 
Kalehe and Chibunda in South Kivu. In areas in which MONUSCO directs a Community Base of 
Operations (CBO), he reasons, these bases exert a powerful deterrent effect on combatants, to 
the extent that the mere presence of UN troops goes far in preventing assaults on civilian 
populations. While Swedish UN staffs concede that MONUSCO’s preventative power does serve 
to reduce violence in areas with a mission presence, and both Swedish observers applaud the 
shift in organizational focus on the part of MONUSCO from Kinshasa to eastern Congo, one 
civilian observer notes: 
“MONUSCO needs a stronger presence in the field, not just in Bukavu or Goma. 
In order to truly protect civilians there definitely needs to be a stronger presence 
in the field to gather information. We can’t simply have the peacekeepers remain 
at their bases without communicating with the civilian population.” (UN Civilian 
Observer, interview, July 2014) 
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 In mentioning Goma and Bukavu, the observer refers to the provincial capital cities of 
North and South Kivu, respectively. Recall Map 1.1 shows that armed groups in eastern Congo 
do not boast a significant presence in either Bukavu or Goma. It must be noted that the high 
concentration of UN troops in and around these cities may in fact have a deterrent effect and 
thus justify substantial UN presence in these urban areas. However, the fact remains that, 
violence clusters in rural pockets of instability with less access to UN protection (MONUSCO at 
a Glance 2014, Oxfam 2014, Radio Okapi 2014c). This suggests that the UN’s recent 
reorganization, resulting in a higher proportion of personnel based in eastern provinces, 
corresponds more closely to the realities on the ground in eastern Congo.  
 In summary, while recent shifts in organizational structure reflect evolving peacekeeping 
priorities and constitute a more practical approach to Congo’s conflict-ridden east, I argue that 
such a transition comes after undue delay. The UN initiated the East-West transition in the 
spring of 2014, while the western part of the country’s last epoch of conflict occurred over a 
decade ago. Though interview respondents’ increasingly positive report of UN rural presence 
following the East-West transition provide evidence for measurable progress, these reports also 
suggest that the transition should have been made far earlier. Through increasing proportional 
troop presence in the east, MONUSCO’s  restructuring allowed for deeper penetration into rural 
regions, increasing the mission’s capacity to prevent attacks on civilian communities. While I 
remain optimistic that the civilians in rural Congo may continue to reap positive dividends from 
the 2014 troop transition, I maintain that the delay in this transition has done much to constrain 
the timely achievement of the mission’s mandate. 
 
MONUSCO and Troop Quality 
 Here I briefly discuss the primary problem areas with MONUSCO troop capacity: short-
term deployments and lack of skill uniformity. The UN identifies Pakistan, India, and 
Bangladesh as key troop-contributing countries to its mission in the DR Congo (MONUSCO at a 
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Glance 2014). Peacekeeping troops assigned to serve with MONUSCO receive placements for 
duration of four to six months. After completing a given placement, troops assigned to the DRC 
transition to another locality, and such rotations continue until individual troops complete their 
service in the Congo. The average peacekeeper may serve in the DRC for about one year. This 
system is identical for all ranks of MONUSCO soldiers, such that commanders and rank-and-file 
troops alike serve on a rotational basis. One Civilian Police Observer discusses the limitations of 
such a transient system, describing its potential to undermine civilian trust in MONUSCO 
troops, as current time constraints do not allow for the building and maintenance of 
constructive relationships. The Observer adds, however, that she does not see significant change 
to the troop deployment structure of MONUSCO as a realistic goal: 
 
“I do not think that it is realistic to expect troops to stay for longer than one year. 
While civilian MONUSCO staff may elect to devote their life’s work to Congo, for 
most military peace keepers the Congo is simply a posting.” (UN Civilian 
Observer, interview, July 2014). 
 
These comments reinforce prior discussion on the role that troop commitment plays in 
MONUSCO’s effectiveness. One Congolese national, working as a Language Consultant for 
MONUSCO, expressed frustration that, generally speaking, most incoming MONUSCO troops 
possess very little background knowledge about the DR Congo. Swedish civilian observers 
likewise commented that, in contrast to some civilian MONUSCO staff who seem intrinsically 
motivated to serve in Congo, most peace keeping troops report to the Congo on orders and may 
stay only for a short-term assignment. Given this lack of commitment, these UN staff reason, it 
is unrealistic to expect MONUSCO troops to put themselves in life-threatening situations in 
order to protect Congolese civilians. A Congolese language consultant and a 9-year veteran 
employee of the UN, touched on a broad philosophical dilemma that continues to confront 
proponents of international collective security arrangements: 
“How can we expect troops to die for a country that is not their own?” 
(UN Language Consultant 2014). 
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Other UN staff raised concerns tied to the skill level of UN troops, rather than troop 
commitment or the duration of individual postings. A Swedish Civilian Observer says that the 
nature of multinational collective security arrangements ensures wide variation in skill level 
among troops, and that this variation is largely dependent on the resources available in troop-
contributing nations and the quality of the domestic militaries within these nations. Romeo 
Dallaire, retired Canadian General and former commander of UN forces in Rwanda, depicts the 
challenges he faced operating during the Rwandan genocide with under-resourced and poorly 
trained troops (Dallaire 2004).  Deficiencies in troop quality or resource readiness force the UN 
to exert additional time and effort ensuring that troops become “battle-ready” before 
deployment. One Swedish Civilian Observer confirms a recommendation found in the 2000 
Brahimi report in suggesting that enhanced training programs could do much to rectify any 
skill-level deficiencies among troops. Writing at the turn of the 21st century, Brahimi ‘s (2000) 
report documented the need for greater skill-level uniformity among troop-contributing 
countries.  The two civilian human rights monitors from Sweden said, 
“The entire purpose of the UN is that it is a multinational organization, but this 
also makes it very difficult to manage.” (UN Civilian Observer, interview, June 
2014). 
 
As a collective security arrangement, multinational troop contributions are foundational 
to the UN model of peacekeeping. However, assessments by UN staff suggest that such 
multinational arrangements may present challenges when attempting to ensure uniform levels 
of skill. The creation of objective criteria for prospective troops, coupled with enhanced pre-
deployment training for all troops, presents a viable solution to this current challenge.  
 
Country-Level Troop Contributions: Structural Racism in Peacekeeping? 
In considering country-level skill disparities among peacekeeping troops, concerns also 
arise regarding the potential for structural racism embedded in the way in which the UN deploys 
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peacekeeping forces. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI), the nations with the highest military expenditures include, in order of descending 
expenditure size: the U.S., China, Russia, the United Kingdom (UK), and Japan. Together, these 
five nations accounted for 1,059 billion USD in military spending (of which the U.S. accounted 
for over 50%, at 682 billion), or 60% of global military expenditures in 2012. The U.S. alone 
bore responsibility for nearly 40% of all military expenditures for that same year (SIPRI 2013).  
Of SIPRI’s top five military spenders, only China breaks UN peacekeeping’s top 15 troop 
contributing countries as of February 2015 (UN Peacekeeping 2015b). The U.S., first in military 
spending, ranks at 66 in troop contributions with just 119 total military and police personnel 
serving in peacekeeping operations globally. According to the UN’s February 2015 report, the 
top five troop contributing nations include, in descending order: Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, 
Ethiopia, and Rwanda (UN Peacekeeping 2015b). Of these five nations, only India cracked 
SIPRI’s top fifteen military spenders in 2012 (SIPRI 2013). In observing military expenditure 
data from SIPRI and troop contribution data from the UN, a key discrepancy emerges: on the 
whole, the countries spending the most to train and equip their own troops do not 
proportionately contribute military personnel to peacekeeping operations.  
 The statistics cited above further corroborate interview responses from MONUSCO 
personnel, suggesting that overall discrepancies in troop quality prove a hindrance to optimal 
mission functioning (UN Civilian Observer, interview, July 2014). In addition, the numerical 
discrepancies between country military spending and country troop contributions also suggest a 
darker conclusion regarding the structural racism of UN peacekeeping. Of the UN’s 16 active 
peacekeeping operations, over half-nine of sixteen-remain geographically situated on the 
African continent. This is twice the amount of even the second densest region in terms of 
peacekeeping, the Middle East, which currently hosts four active missions. The European 
continent hosts only one active UN mission- United Nations Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK)-while North America remains free of any UN operation (UN Peacekeeping 
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2015c). Taking these figures together with SIPRI data, it appears that the UN receives a 
disproportionate share of troop contributions from countries with relatively low levels of 
military spending. The UN then deploys these troops to its peacekeeping missions, over 50% of 
which operate on the African continent. In summary, a phenomenon arises whereby relatively 
poorly equipped troops bear the primary responsibility for international peacekeeping in an 
African context. 
Despite numerous negative assessments (UN Civilian observer, interview, July 2014; UN 
Language Consultant, interview, June 2014)  of troop quality among MONUSCO peacekeepers, 
some interview respondents did cite progress on troop capacity development. One Congolese 
professional employed by MONUSCO as a lead interpreter points to MONUSCO’s trainings and 
capacity-development efforts with the Congolese army (FARDC) as a positive achievement for 
the mission, suggesting that MONUSCO troops do in fact possess a sufficient level of skill to 
execute the mission’s mandate. Additionally, other interview respondents cited MONUSCO’s 
defeat of the M-23 militia group in 2013 as evidence of the battle proficiency of its troops (BBC 
2013, Aljazeera 2013). To the extent that troop-level deficiencies persist, however, MONUSCO 
remains inherently limited in its capacity to protect Congolese civilians. MONUSCO troops 
function sub-optimally on two distinct dimensions: first, troops appear to lack a dedication to 
the welfare of Congolese civilians and, by extension, commitment to MONUSCO’s peace 
building objectives in eastern Congo. Also of concern, the multinational nature of troop 
contributions, characteristic of UN missions, often serves to undermine practical skill level and 
battle-readiness among MONUSCO troops.  
 
Looking Ahead: MONUSCO and Collaborating with the Host Country 
 In this chapter, I examined a variety factors internal to MONUSCO that serve to limit the 
mission’s success in protecting civilians in eastern Congo. These include a lack of uniform 
standards for peacekeeper intervention, a mismatch between the placement of MONUSCO 
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personnel in urban and Western areas and the occurrence of conflict in the rural east, and 
shortcomings in MONUSCO troops attributable to lack of commitment and intra-mission skill-
level disparities. In the next chapter, I address MONUSCO’s collaboration with several sectors of 
Congolese society. I argue that MONUSCO’s success in protecting civilians is limited by the 
mission’s preference for “top-down” collaborations. I use the phrase “top-down” to refer to 
initiatives and consultations conducted primarily at the level of political and security-sector 
elites. Evidence in this study builds the case that the UN prioritizes cooperation with official 
government actors above collaboration with Congolese communities. By working more closely 
with community members, the UN may in fact enhance its capacity to protect civilians in eastern 
Congo. 
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Chapter IV: MONUSCO and Collaboration Breakdown 
 In An Agenda for Peace (1992), former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
identified host-country collaboration as a key determinant of the success of any UN mission 
(Boutros-Ghali 1992).  Interviews with UN staff and Congolese community members served to 
corroborate Boutros-Ghali’s assertion of the importance of host-country collaboration. In the 
previous chapter, my analysis focused on success-inhibiting factors internal to the UN mission 
in the DR Congo. This chapter shifts focus to cooperation dynamics between the UN and various 
sectors of Congolese society. Here, I make two arguments concerning MONUSCO’s cooperation 
with local actors in the DRC. First, as indicated above, I argue that the mission prioritizes elite-
level collaboration, at the expense of consultations and arrangements involving Congolese 
community members. I use “elite-level” to denote cooperation between the UN and political 
elites in the Congo. Reliance on government figures inhibits MONUSCO’s civilian protection 
capacity, as to a large extent Congolese political elites remain detached from the needs of 
Congolese citizens. The neglect of actors outside institutionalized political office reflects poor  
strategic judgment, for which MONUSCO bears primary responsibility. 
 In addition to the UN’s poorly prioritized collaboration strategy, capacity deficiencies in 
the Congolese security sector present an additional challenge to effective host-country 
collaboration. To its credit, the UN continues to prioritize capacity development programs for 
components of the Congolese security sector, including the national army (FARDC) and police 
force (PNC). These programs will prove essential as the DRC moves to consolidate peace in its 
eastern provinces (UN Team Leader of Interpreters, interview, 2014, UN News Centre 2014). 
Currently, however, capacity shortcomings within the FARDC serve to limit the effectiveness of 
MONUSCO. This occurs as MONUSCO’s collaborative model requires FARDC presence and 
cooperation in order to conduct military operations. Thus, in areas in which FARDC is unable to 
operate effectively, the UN is therefore constrained by the national military’s unsatisfactory 
performance. The first objective of MONUSCO’s mandate charges the mission with protecting 
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civilians in eastern Congo from rebel militias in the DRC (UNSC 2013). This objective is the 
subject of the current study. In establishing this mandate, UNSC Resolution 2098 (2013) 
requires that MONUSCO work collaboratively with Congolese authorities to identify and 
respond to threats to local civilians (UNSC 2013). Thus, in recognizing persistent limitations 
characteristic of the Congolese security sector, one must recognize subsequent limitations to 
MONUSCO’s ability to fulfill its primary objective in eastern DRC.  
 Effective collaboration is imperative not only for the immediate achievement of 
MONUSCO’s primary objective-the protection of Congolese civilians- but for the long-term 
peace and security of the DRC. One UN employee mentioned that many locals he encounters 
believe that the UN should simply replace the FARDC. The officer cited rising trust levels 
between locals and MONUSCO staff, a trend that stands in stark contrast to persistent levels of 
distrust between civilians and FARDC soldiers (UN Community Liaison Officer, interview, June 
2014). While increasingly positive attitudes toward MONUSCO perhaps merit recognition, these 
trends represent the alarming persistence of security-sector limitations in the DRC. 
 
Consultations with an Undemocratic Government 
 In Chapter 2, a historical analysis of governance in the DR Congo depicts over a century 
of undemocratic leaders who did not sufficiently respond to the needs of the Congolese people. 
From colonial extraction and forced slave labor to the neocolonial hijacking of post-
independence nationalism to the kleptocracy and neglect of a dictatorial Cold-War era regime, 
the political history of the DRC is one far too often characterized by a citizenry surviving in spite 
of its leaders rather than progressing through their support (Hochschild 1998, Nzongola 2002, 
Lumumba 1961, De Witte 2001, Fanon 1969). The relationship of the Congolese electorate to its 
elected leaders is important to understand in the context of the UN’s mission in the country, as 
highlighted by the previous quotes from Congolese community members. The UN’s current 
mandate requires personnel to “use all means necessary to protect civilians.” I argue here that 
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efficient protection becomes impossible when the UN prioritizes cooperation with an 
undemocratic government over cooperation with Congolese society.  
 In the DR Congo, the current government is not responsive to the needs of the majority 
of Congolese citizens. Community members, in contrast, possess a much more comprehensive 
knowledge of the needs of Congolese civilians and the challenges that they face. Thus, to 
effectively protect civilians in eastern Congo, the UN must shift focus from high-level 
consultations with government officials to more frequent, transparent, and substantive 
collaborations with Congolese communities. The scope of the present study did not allow for 
consultation with interview respondents on a successful framework for community 
collaboration. This avenue for future research poses great significance for UN collaboration 
policy in the DR Congo.  
 As the 2016 presidential election approaches, the UN lists ensuring a free and fair 
electoral process as one of the mission’s top priorities, and the mission’s attempt to foster 
dialogue between political opposition parties and the current government elicit praise from 
community members and UN Staff (UN Political Officer, UN Team Leader of Interpreters, 
Congolese Community Members, interviews, June-July 2014). Some UN staff contest that the 
UN places so much weight on election preparations that resources that may otherwise be used 
for development projects may be diverted to electoral monitoring for the 2016 cycle (UN 
Community Liaison Officer, June 2014). 
  In an analysis of the country’s 2011 elections, however, Stearns (2011) suggests that 
despite the fact that the process received the international “free and fair” stamp of approval and 
extensive electoral operations by the UN, the results of these elections did not meaningfully 
reflect the will of the Congolese people (Stearns 2011). Many Congolese still feel that the current 
government has not done enough to address the needs of Congolese citizens. Rumors of 
attempts by current President Joseph Kabila to alter the state constitution-thereby abolishing 
presidential term limits-do little to remedy public perception of the current authorities. Such 
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actions, in contrast, convey to many that the Congolese executive cares little about the interests 
of the nation’s citizens (Stearns 2015, Radio Okapi 2014a). 
 In the context of this lack of trust between the electorate and those elected to represent 
their interests, the preference on the part of the UN for high-level political negotiations becomes 
difficult to understand. While Boutros-Ghali emphasizes the need for collegial relationships 
between UN personnel and local political officials, such relationships must not come at the 
expense of an equally collegial relationship with Congolese communities. Theoretically, in a 
society sufficiently democratic to presume that elected officials, on average, reliably represent 
the will of that society’s citizens, one might argue that consistent consultation with these elected 
officials may go far in identifying and responding to the needs of the people. In a country where 
this democratic link is weaker, however, the relationship between elected officials and the needs 
of the electorate remains far less clear.  
 
Collaboration with Government Officials 
“When MONUSCO came, they signed a contract with the government…the government 
does not know what the Congolese population needs. If they made the contract with us, 
we could better advise them on what needs to be done.” (Congolese Community 
Member, interview, June 2014). 
 
 The above statement by a Congolese community member reflects consensus among 
community interview respondents with whom I spoke in South Kivu regarding the detachment 
of the Congolese government from the needs of its people. Another respondent added,  
 
“If MONUSCO came to us civilians, we could more accurately advise them on what they 
need to succeed and on what needs to be done. The problem is that they go to the 
government and the government does not know what we need. We recognize that they 
are not accomplishing their mission but we do not necessarily know why. The 
government may have an answer to this question.” (Congolese Community Member, 
interview, June 2014). 
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 Statements by Congolese community members reinforce perceptions of the Congolese 
government as questionably democratic and out-of-touch with Congolese civilians. In such a 
situation, in which the state remains detached from the will of society, UN consultation with the 
state proves exclusionary in the sense that Congolese civilians do not feel that MONUSCO gives 
consideration to their interests. 
 
Congolese Communities and the Desire for Engagement 
 The UN must prioritize engagement with Congolese communities in order to assess and 
address the needs of the Congolese people. This fact is not lost on Congolese citizens. As one UN 
employee, a Congolese national, stated, 
“Civil society must not stop until their voices are heard. Congolese citizens must continue 
denouncing atrocities in the presence of MONUSCO and must continue to push the 
Congolese government to fulfill its role in providing security. They must push for the new 
mandate to be implemented in practice; they must push for MONUSCO to respect its 
mandate.” (UN Team Leader of Interpreters, interview, July 2014). 
 
 This UN official’s comment suggests several characteristics about the nature of the 
relationship between the UN and civil society in the DRC. First, community members 
themselves desire more frequent and or effective collaboration with the UN. Interviews with 
Congolese community members suggest that this belief remains pervasive throughout Congolese 
society (Congolese Community Members, interviews, June-July 2014).  
 
Public Perceptions and the Role of the Community Liaison Officer 
 The UN interpreter’s comment above also conveys a certain level of knowledge of UN 
operations on the part of Congolese society. This is evident as the interpreter implies that 
community members possess adequate knowledge of the UN’s current mandate. To be sure, the 
community representatives I consulted in Kalehe, South Kivu, possessed knowledge of the 
current mandate as created by UNSC Resolution 2098, even rivaling the knowledge of many UN 
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personnel respondents. Multiple local leaders described the difference between MONUC’s 
observational and defensive roles and MONUSCO’s uniquely offensive capacities as defined in 
Resolutions 2098 and 2147 (UNSC 2013; Congolese Community Member, interview, June 
2014). However, on the point of generalized community knowledge of the workings of the UN in 
eastern Congo, I offer several points of conflicting evidence. Interviews with UN personnel and 
Congolese community members suggest that there exists a great deal of variation among 
Congolese citizens regarding level of knowledge about MONUSCO. To address knowledge 
discrepancies among Congolese civilians, the UN created a new position, the Community 
Liaison officer: 
“In 2010, the Civilian Affairs Unit began to dispatch Community Liaison Officers. In the 
places where there was a good relationship between the peacekeeping commander and 
the CLO, it produced very good results.” (UN Civilian Observer 2014). 
 
 In an interview with one Community Liaison Officer in June 2014, the officer described 
his role as fostering open communication between Congolese civilians and UN peacekeepers. 
The officer said, 
“Earlier, locals did not understand MONUSCO’s role. Now, CLOs live within the 
community and explain the UN’s capacity as well as its limitations.” (UN Community 
Liaison Officer, June 2014). 
 
 The officer describes several misconceptions he frequently encounters regarding the UN 
mission among Congolese civilians. Regarding the mission’s capacity, the officer states that 
many locals expect the UN to effectively replace the Congolese military (FARDC), and in his job 
as a CLO he explains the impracticality of this goal. Regarding the limitations of the UN force, 
CLOs often find themselves doing “damage control” after peacekeeping troops make false 
promises to locals. False promises often include offering to give civilians rides to work or to pay 
for medications (UN Community Liaison Officer 2014).  
 CLOs prove a progressive step for UN-civilian relations. Despite this progress, however, 
trust building remains an area of concern that serves to undermine UN operations. During a 
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focus group interview with Congolese community representatives in Kalehe, leaders shared 
views that they themselves held about the nature of the UN presence in eastern DRC. The 
leaders additionally commented on the perceptions that their communities hold regarding the 
UN. Several themes emerged, including that UN soldiers continue to collaborate secretly with 
the Congolese military and rebel soldiers to the detriment of civilians or that mineral wealth 
extraction is in fact the ulterior motive for many UN operations in the Congo (Congolese 
Community Member, interview, June 2014).  During interviews with both UN staff and 
community members, Congolese nationals tended to respond to the question,  
“Have you observed any situations in which UN peacekeepers have harmed your community in 
some way? Please describe these situations,” 
 
by citing sexual assault cases involving UN personnel and  civilian Congolese women. In 2012, 
the Women Under Siege project released a piece entitled “When those meant to keep the peace 
commit sexualized violence” which referenced persistent allegations-substantiated by 
confidential UN reports- of sexual assault by peacekeepers in eastern DRC (Novick 2012). 
Likewise, Mayesha Alam, Associate Director for the Georgetown Institute on Women, Peace and 
Security, notes that sexual violence perpetrated by MONUSCO soldiers against women and girls 
in eastern DRC remains a barrier to MONUSCO’s credibility. Alam and Naama Haviv, Executive 
Director of Panzi Foundation USA, contest that MONUSCO often fails to prevent armed groups 
from using sexualized violence as a tool to fracture Congolese communities and gain control 
over land, resources, and local power structures. Additionally, Alam notes that MONUSCO’s 
failure often extends beyond passive complicity when troops themselves commit rape against 
Congolese men, women, and children (Alam 2015; Haviv 2015). 
 On a more abstract level,  Congolese nationals and foreign UN staff often decried the 
impact of the UN’s perpetual presence on the housing market, pollution as an artifact of UN 
facilities, and increases in prostitution as a profitable industry in eastern DRC (UN Team Leader 
of Interpreters 2014, UN Civilian Observer 2014). While Congolese nationals, whether on the 
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UN’s payroll or not, tended to express more negative assessments of the UN’s impact on 
communities in eastern Congo, all respondents acknowledged negative consequences borne by 
civilian populations. In this context, the practical impact of UN Community Liaison Officers 
(CLOs) appears limited. Given the fourteen-year presence of the UN in the DRC and the 
accumulated grievances of Congolese communities, public opinion may be resistant to change.  
 
The Community Action Network (CAN) as a Framework for Collaboration 
 One initiative that emerged during conversation with a UN CLO was the UN’s 
collaborative human rights and atrocity prevention monitoring system, called the Community 
Action Network (CAN). In a model similar to that of many civilian police forces, CAN relies on 
community members to serve as informants. In return for providing data in real time on the 
occurrence of attacks against civilians, civilians gain access to the UN’s rapid response capacity 
to deter these and further attacks (UN Community Liaison Officer 2014). As a CLO, a UN 
employee receives an official UN mobile phone with a pre-approved amount of phone credits for 
use in the CAN program. CAN divides civilian populations into geographic clusters, with a focal 
point established within each cluster. Each CLO assumes responsibility over a given focal point, 
and community members within his or her cluster gain access to the phone number of their 
assigned CLO. In the event of a rebel attack, civilians may call this number and report the time, 
date, and location of the event. MONUSCO keeps a daily record of reports and deploys locally 
based troops as first respondents to the scene of an attack. 
 During my interview with this CLO, the officer described an increase in the rate of calls 
to his MONUSCO phone. He attributed this increase to an increased level of trust on the part of 
Congolese civilians, stating, 
“I receive many alerts, and people have less fear to report. In contrast, they do not trust 
the FARDC [the Congolese military]. Trust is building between locals and MONUSCO. 
[Through the CAN program] if civilians see two or three people carrying weapons in their 
jackets, can anonymously report to MONUSCO” (UN Community Liaison Officer, 
interview, June 2014). 
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 While the officer reportedly instructs community members not to abuse the network by 
reporting minor disputes with family or neighbors, he describes the effectiveness of the system 
at responding to the violent actions of militia groups or in rooting out corruption within the 
Congolese military (FARDC). The officer describes one alert he received regarding an illegal 
roadblock that the FARDC imposed on civilians in South Kivu, requiring locals to pay a bribe 
before they granted permission to pass through the blockade. Upon receiving the alert, 
MONUSCO personnel communicated with FARDC, instructing the soldiers to remove the 
unauthorized blockade by the end of the day (UN Community Liaison Officer). Such open 
networks of communication pose the potential for building trust and cooperation between 
MONUSCO, the Congolese security sector, and local communities. However, following over a 
decade of distrustful relationships, I suggest that such trust-building efforts may not bring 
immediate results. Long-term analysis may shed light upon the effectiveness of the CAN and 
CLO systems in improving relationships between the UN and local communities.  
 
The Nature of Interactions: A Desire for Substance 
 Earlier in this chapter, I detailed the reasons why the UN’s decision to prioritize high-
level political consultations may inadvertently disempower Congolese communities, to the 
extent that elected officials in the DRC fail to represent the interests of their constituents. I do 
not assume, however, that political consultations and collaboration with community members 
remain mutually exclusive endeavors. On the contrary, for the UN to operate at full capacity in 
the Congo, reciprocal working relationships must be established and maintained between both 
state and non-state actors. At the time of this study, the UN was engaged in regular 
consultations with community members in the DRC.  Community members acknowledged the 
UN’s efforts to foster dialogue, with some even offering positive evaluations of their 
collaborative encounters with MONUSCO. On the whole, however, many Congolese community 
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members remain dissatisfied with the content of discussions between UN and community 
actors. Leaders explained that collaborative meetings often resembled ceremonial affairs with 
little practical substance (Congolese Community Members, interview, June 2014). While leaders 
conceded that on several occasions UN Staff did ask for their input, they had yet to see their 
suggestions integrated into MONUSCO’s practices. Additionally, leaders repeatedly identified 
government consultations as a priority for the UN, while describing community consultations as 
a secondary consideration for MONUSCO (Congolese Community Members, interview, June 
2014). Rather than including communities as partners in strategy development, the mission’s 
approach to collaboration appears reactive, as rural instability pushes MONUSCO staff to enlist 
the support of rural communities: 
“When they arrived, they did not consult us or ask our opinion. They simply came and 
starting working without asking what the population here needed. That is why they did 
not succeed” (Congolese Community Members, interview, June 2014). 
 
“There is also a problem of strategy. Normally they should create a strategy and ask us for our 
input upon their arrival.” (Congolese Community Members, interview, June 2014). 
 
 Community members recognized that the UN’s default method of operations involved 
consulting government sources first and local communities only when necessary. Additionally, 
local leaders  did not “buy in” to the nature of these community consultations. Respondents 
described the meetings as largely ceremonial in nature and lacking in real substance. One leader 
summarized his distaste for the apparent lack of purpose in many of the consultations: 
“I meet them often at ceremonies. They hold different ceremonies where they serve food 
to people who attend” (Congolese Community Member, interview, June 2014). 
 
 The leader’s response does not depict a congenial relationship between the UN and 
Congolese communities, but rather a community members savvy to the UN’s use of 
collaborations to enhance the mission’s public image. Interview respondents cited a lack of 
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substance in interactions as reasons for the sustained counterproductive relationship between 
the UN and local residents in rural South Kivu, DRC. 
 The comments of one Congolese national and UN employee, a language consultant, 
corroborate the views of community members regarding a lack of meaningful inclusion at the 
highest level of UN deliberations. Referring to a series of mass rapes in the summer of 2014 in 
Uvira, a community near Bukavu in South Kivu, DRC, the consultant said, 
“If the UN were in touch with those who actually endure these atrocities, they would be 
better able to develop solutions. As it stands, they develop elaborate strategies in New 
York. The impacts of these ready-made projects so far are invisible and insignificant” 
(UN Language Consultant, interview, June 2014). 
 
 The consultant expresses an opinion shared by Congolese community representatives: in 
order for consultations with local leaders to be productive and contribute constructively to peace 
building in the DRC, the UN must include these local leaders early in the strategy-development 
process and sincerely attempt to integrate community recommendations into UN practice.  
 In Global Shadows: Africa and the Neoliberal World Order, anthropologist James 
Ferguson leverages a similar critique against the “governance of Africa from afar” suggesting 
that the “international imperialism” of such agencies as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
the World Bank, UN agencies, and international NGOs serves to usurp the sovereignty of 
African states and their citizens (Ferguson 2006). Similarly, in The Grand Strategies of 
Humanitarianism,  Michael Barnett and Jack Snyder address the tendency of peace building 
agencies to “rely on general models from their most recent experiences” when faced with 
complex conflict scenarios and tasked with constructing sustainable peace (Barnett and Snyder 
2008, p.152). Decades of theory and practice attest to the ineffectual nature of “one size fits all” 
models developed in the West and transplanted onto African realities. If MONUSCO is to 
transcend a legacy of peace building failure in Congo, it is imperative that the mission learns to 
value substantive collaboration with Congolese civilians. 
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Working Alongside FARDC 
 In his comprehensive historical account of the Congo, Dr. Georges Nzongola, details the 
ways that Mobutu’s authoritarian rule served to disempower the Congolese military. At its 
height in the Mobutu era, the DRC boasted impressive military prowess, with some elite 
Congolese soldiers even attending specialized training programs in the United States (Nzongola 
2002). However, during the final years of Mobutu’s reign, as the dictator began to sense his 
loosening grip on power, the military began to decline along with its commander-in-chief. 
Mobutu intentionally pitted paramilitary contingents against one another to ensure that no one 
group posed a threat to his rule (Nzongola 2002). One 2011 report produced by a coalition of 
international and community-based non-governmental organizations operating in eastern 
Congo, entitled Taking a Stand on Security Sector Reform, depicts the ways in which the 
Congolese security sector continues to operate below capacity6. The report cites numerous 
occasions of FARDC collusion in human rights abuses and attacks on civilians. According to 
Taking a Stand, FARDC remains incapable of transcending a legacy of inadequacy due to lack of 
will for reform on the part of the Congolese government and lack of sufficient engagement and 
support on the part of the international community (Open Society Foundation 2011). 
 My conversations with UN personnel during qualitative interviews during my fieldwork 
reinforce this assessment of the FARDC as operating at sub-optimal capacity. When scholars 
speak of security sector reform in the DRC, they often include both the Congolese military 
(FARDC) and the national police force (PNC, Cakaj 2010). This study directs attention to the 
FARDC and the peace-building burden the force shares with MONUSCO. MONUSCO and the 
FIB remain legally obligated to collaborate with the FARDC in pursuit of armed groups in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!6!Contributors to the report include the African Association of Human Rights, The Congolese Network for Security Sector Reform, 
Groupe Lotus, the League of Voters, the Intercultural Institute for Peace in the Great Lakes Region, the Eastern Congo Initiative, the 
Enough Project, the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa, Refugees International, the International Federation for Human 
Rights, the European Network for Central Africa, the Ecumenical Network for Central Africa, and the UK All-Party Parliamentary 
Group on the Great Lakes Region of Africa!
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eastern DRC. In this manner, capacity shortfalls within the FARDC pose a greater impact on 
MONUSCO’s efficacy than do any shortcomings within the PNC. 
   Several MONUSCO staff referenced the poor living conditions of soldiers and the 
government’s failure to pay troops on a consistent basis.  Such a sense of desperation, the 
respondents reasoned, does much to explain the motives behind FARDC abuse and exploitation 
of Congolese civilians (UN Team Leader of Interpreters, interview, July 2014; UN Language 
Consultant, interview, June 2014; UN Community Liaison Officer, interview, June 2014). The 
opinions of these respondents match data cited in a report by the Enough Project detailing army 
abuses of Congolese civilians in Congo’s northeastern provinces (Cakaj 2010). Capacity 
development may in fact limit human rights violations on the part of the FARDC and the PNC.  
 The majority of UN staff, both foreign and Congolese, recognize that MONUSCO’s 
mission relies on collaboration between the UN and state authorities. (UN Community Liaison 
Officer, interview, June 2014). Interview respondents also recognize that while collaboration is 
necessary, it also poses a threat to effective peacekeeping operations, particularly in areas where 
FARDC capacity is weakest. In assessing MONUSCO’s overall success, a Senegalese political 
affairs officer working from the mission’s provincial headquarters in Bukavu said, 
“An analysis of MONUSCO’s success requires nuance. Most of MONUSCO’s activities are 
done in collaboration with the national government. MONUSCO has its objectives, but 
implementation of these objectives requires [cooperation with] local partners. As 
MONUSCO, we do not determine all of the factors that influence success” (UN Political 
Affairs Officer, interview, July 2014). 
 
 FARDC inadequacy may in fact offer a convenient scapegoat to deflect attention away 
from the UN’s own shortcomings. However, given that host-country collaboration remains a 
crucial predictor of success in peacekeeping initiatives, any failure on the part of the FARDC 
necessarily affects the work and effectiveness of MONUSCO (Boutros-Ghali 1992). One Swedish 
civilian observer, who worked with a UN joint police monitoring team in 2010, described how 
lack of capacity on the part of the Congolese police force (PNC) impacted the work of her team.  
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“[I was part of a] Swedish-funded project aiming to send civilian observers to work in a 
joint monitoring team together with the police. We would work with Congolese police 
and local authorities to follow up on human rights issues. My specific task concerned 
sexual and gender-based violence. It was my job to ensure that [local authorities] had 
information about sexual violence. My perspective was more of a theoretical one, as I am 
a civilian and not a police officer. Our job was to assist MONUC in going out into the 
field to report on human rights violations, sexual violence, and child protection issues. 
That was what we were doing in theory. In practice, we had some constraints. For 
example, we were supposed to be deployed in the field and to actually be based in the 
field, but we ended up staying in Bukavu. There were police reforms in the Kivus as part 
of the stabilization plan for eastern Congo. At the time I worked for MONUC, the newly 
trained police who had been through these reforms had not yet arrived in South Kivu. 
This meant that there was not actually a counterpart for us to work with. Instead, we 
went out and prepared for the arrival of the newly trained police. We could not go into 
the field because we did not have the support of the newly trained police force” (UN 
Civilian Observer, interview, July 2014). 
 
 This observer’s experience highlights the impact that national security-sector shortfalls 
have on MONUSCO’s ability to operate effectively. In the previous chapter, I addressed 
shortfalls internal to MONUSCO. Even in the absence of these internal limitations, MONUSCO’s 
potential would remain limited by security sector shortfalls, given that the mission’s objectives 
hinge on collaboration with local authorities. Where military operations require cooperative 
effort between MONUSCO peacekeepers and the FARDC, rural Congolese civilians bear the 
burden of perpetual violence and instability in areas lacking sufficient FARDC preventative 
presence (Oxfam 2014, UN Team Leader of Interpreters, interview, July 2014).  
 As a collective security organization, the UN works through a framework of respect for 
national sovereignty, only breaching the authority of sovereign states in cases where these states 
fail to fulfill their protective duties toward citizens (ICISS 2001). Even in cases warranting UN 
intervention, the UN prizes collaboration with local authorities rather than isolated intervention 
(Boutros-Ghali 1992). In the short term, MONUSCO’s ability to protect civilians depends, at 
least in part, on its ability to cooperate with local security forces. In the long term, the ability of 
the Congolese state to protect civilians from internal and external threats also depends on a 
robust security sector (Nzongola 2002, 2014a).  
!!
The Promise of Peace: UNSC Resolutions 2098 and 2147 and the Protection of Congolese Civilians 
!
! !
73!
A two-tier solution may go far in addressing the dilemma of security sector inadequacy in 
the DR Congo. To address immediate threats to civilians, MONUSCO must attain the freedom to 
operate unilaterally in contexts in which FARDC shortcomings effectively prohibit the mission 
from protecting Congolese civilians. This freedom must only apply in emergency situations 
where FARDC inadequacy presents the only obstacle to MONUSCO’s success in protecting 
civilians and where unilateral operations pose a near certain probability of success. 
Understanding the long-term implications of the health of the Congolese security sector, 
increased “emergency freedom” for MONUSCO must be granted alongside continuous training 
and capacity-building efforts for FARDC and the PNC. While the UN’s investment in the 
Congolese security sector represents years of international concern for reform, it is imperative 
for this issue to remain a top MONUSCO priority in the coming months and years. Current 
projects and initiatives to increase national security capacity include military training and 
human rights sensitization programs for the FARDC and the PNC (UN Team Leader of 
Interpreters, interview, July 2014; UN Political Affairs Officer, interview, July 2014; UN News 
Centre 2014).  While these programs build the long-term capacity of the Congolese security 
sector and should be sustained and improved, the programs do little to address immediate 
security threats to Congolese civilians. 
 As MONUSCO focuses on neutralizing armed groups in Congo’s eastern provinces, such 
neutralization must not occur at the expense of strengthening local military and police capacity. 
Should Congo’s immediate security needs-and MONUSCO’s subsequent military response- 
detract emphasis from security sector development, any military operations by MONUSCO are 
likely to be counterproductive in the long term. Preliminary evidence for this assertion may be 
found in the resurgence of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) rebel militia in North Kivu in the 
fall of 2014. While the UN and the FARDC effectively banished the group from Congo in the 
spring of 2014 following a string of military offensives, the group resurfaced as a potent threat to 
civilians in Beni, North Kivu several months later. Expressing frustration at persistent instability 
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in North Kivu, local residents commented that the September and October 2014 ADF attacks 
occurred in communities that exist in close proximity to FARDC bases (Radio Okapi 2014b). To 
provide for the long-term stability of Congolese communities, FARDC must possess the capacity 
to prevent and respond effectively to similar attacks in the future. 
 
MONUSCO’s Collaboration Dilemma 
 Where Chapter 3 addressed MONUSCO’s internal failings, Chapter 4 presented 
additional key challenges to the mission’s ability to protect civilians. This second set of 
challenges arises from the mission’s attempts to collaborate with local authorities in eastern 
Congo. In this analysis, I identified two primary collaborative dilemmas for MONUSCO. The 
first concerns MONUSCO’s preference for high-level political relationships, at the expense of 
substantive working relationships with Congolese community members. I stressed the 
significance of this unfortunate prioritization through detailing the extent to which, given the 
country’s current political context, one cannot assume that elected officials in the DRC 
accurately represent the needs of Congolese civilians.  
A second and equally challenging limitation concerns capacity shortcomings within the 
Congolese security sector and the way that these shortcomings transcend national security 
capacity to impact the success of MONUSCO. MONUSCO’s operations, and in fact UN 
operations more generally, remain collaborative in nature. The UN’s collaborative model of 
peacekeeping means that any shortcoming in national capacity poses the potential to prevent 
the UN from achieving its objectives in any given country. In the case of the DRC, where 
collaborative civilian protection efforts feature prominently in the UN mission’s mandate in the 
country, such limitations gain added significance. 
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Chapter V: Conclusion 
MONUSCO remains the UN’s largest, most expensive, and longest-running 
peacekeeping force (MONUSCO at a Glance 2014). With an estimated 5-6 million fatalities since 
1994, the conflict in eastern DRC remains the world’s deadliest since the conclusion of the 
Second World War. MONUSCO’s ability to protect civilians-and thus prevent fatalities-is the 
subject of this study. An analysis of peacekeeping philosophy and a brief overview of the 
historical roots of the conflict in Congo provide a framework through which to assess 
MONUSCO’s current operations.  
MONUSCO’s current mandate, which dates to UNSC Resolution 2098 (March 2013), 
stipulates that the mission must protect civilians, neutralize armed groups, limit trade in illicit 
arms, and support state judicial processes to uphold the rule of law. The resolution additionally 
provides for the creation of a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) a specialized offensive battalion 
uniquely tasked to neutralize militias. Finally, the 2013 resolution grants MONUSCO the 
authority to capitalize on drone surveillance technology to monitor human rights abuses (UNSC 
2013). MONUSCO’s four objectives aim at quelling simmering violence in DR Congo’s eastern 
provinces, conceptualized here as North and South Kivu and Orientale.  The UNSC reaffirmed 
these objectives, and MONUSCO’s expanded authority, by issuing UNSC Resolution 2147 
(2014).  This study focuses on MONUSCO’s first mission objective: the protection of civilians. 
Given the increase in authority afforded to MONUSCO by Resolutions 2098 (2013) and 
2147 (2014), this study examines the extent to which greater latitude for MONUSCO translates 
into peace dividends for Congolese civilians. In addition to external research data and current 
news from the DRC, I rely on a series of semi-structured interviews with Congolese community 
members and UN staff (foreign and Congolese). Interviews offer insight into assessments of 
MONUSCO’s prior and current performance, and address the tangible impact of the 2013 
resolution.  
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In this study, I present the following question: to what extent has an increase in 
MONUSCO’s peacekeeping authority, as contained in UNSC Resolution 2098 (2013), translated 
into an increased capacity to protect civilians? In response, I argue that while assessments of 
MONUSCO do in fact reflect observable progress in the mission’s capacity to protect civilians, 
these capacity developments fall short both of initial enthusiasm accompanying Resolution 
2098 and of “peace dividends”-measurable increases in civilian security-that might be 
reasonably expected in the nearly 1.5 years from March 2013 until the time of data collection 
(June and July 2014). To explain the gap between expected and observed progress, I offer 
several characteristics of MONUSCO’s current operations. On one dimension, I contest that the 
mission possesses three key internal shortcomings that limit its ability to adequately fulfill its 
primary objective- the protection of Congolese civilians. These limitations include lack of 
uniformity in the internalization of human rights norms among Congolese troops, a geographic 
mismatch between the concentration of violence and the concentration of MONUSCO resources, 
and shortcomings in peacekeeping troop quality.  
A second argument addresses problems with the ways in which MONUSCO collaborates 
with the Congolese state. Former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali writes in An 
Agenda for Peace (1992) that effective collaboration with the host country serves as a necessary 
condition for the success of any UN mission (Boutros-Ghali 1992). MONUSCO’s current strategy 
for collaboration with the Congolese state proves problematic on two levels. The mission’s 
collaborative efforts ultimately fail because UN staff prioritizes collaboration with Congolese 
political elites and government institutions at the expense of inclusive consultation with 
Congolese communities. Secondly, the structure of the UN mission requires that peacekeepers 
work in tandem with the Congolese military (FARDC) in pursuit of armed groups. To the extent 
that FARDC lacks the capacity to protect Congolese civilians through confronting and 
eliminating armed militias, FARDC’s shortcomings thus constrain MONUSCO’s ability to 
achieve its primary objective.  
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Internal Limitations: MONUSCO’s Structural Failures 
 MONUSCO’s civilian protection potential remains limited by three primary internal 
shortcomings: a lack of uniform standards for the implementation of human rights norms, the 
seemingly illogical arrangement of MONUSCO resources relative to the nature of the current 
conflict in the DRC, and limitations related to peacekeeping troop quality. 
 MONUSCO’s presence in the DRC traces its origins to the early 21st century. At the same 
time, a flurry of scholarship and activism brought a critical eye to the goals and methods of 
international peacekeeping, most notably through the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty and the development of the Responsibility to Protect, or R2P 
(ICISS 2001, Power 2003). The evolution of MONUSCO’s peacekeeping mandates parallel an 
evolution in the international peacekeeping conversation, reflecting a transition away from 
preventing violence between states and toward an imperative to protect individual civilians from 
human rights abuses committed by states and non-state actors (Mansson 2005, ICISS 2001, 
Goldstein 2011).  MONUSCO’s current mandate, in placing unprecedented emphasis on the 
protection of civilians, represents the current manifestation of these evolving norms.  
 Despite the centrality of protecting the human rights of individual civilians as contained 
in Resolutions 2098 and 2147, and despite growing agreement on the importance of civilian 
protection, gaps still exist in understanding among UN peacekeepers concerning how such 
norms might be implemented in eastern DRC. Interview respondents-both UN staff and 
Congolese community members-express frustration at the lack of uniform standards for UN 
intervention on behalf of civilians. Respondents add that no accountability mechanism requires 
peacekeepers to intervene. 
The absence of uniform understanding of intervention standards and the definition of 
“civilian protection” limit the ability of MONUSCO troops to intervene on behalf of civilians. On 
an organizational level, the mission’s geographic distribution of resources has to date limited 
MONUSCO’s capacity to effectively protect civilians. The majority of armed groups in today’s 
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DRC operate in rural, sparsely populated areas in the country’s eastern provinces. In contrast, 
MONUSCO retains a disproportionately large share of its resources in Kinshasa, the nation’s 
capital, located in the far west of the DRC. Additionally, mission resources and troops remain 
concentrated in urban provincial capitals such as Goma and Bukavu (MONUSCO at a Glance 
2014). In late spring 2014, the mission began a large-scale shift of resources from Kinshasa to 
Congo’s eastern provinces (UN Political Affairs Officer, interview, July 2014). Such a shift 
represents an overdue development, and the tangible consequences of this shift remain to be 
seen. 
In addition to shortcomings surrounding uniformity in intervention and in geographic 
organization of resources, troop-level capacity shortfalls continue to limit MONUSCO’s 
effectiveness. Assessments by UN staff and Congolese community representatives reveal a lack 
of uniformity in troop skill level and readiness, systemic lack of commitment on the part of UN 
troops, and a lack of trust between UN troops and Congolese civilians. Regardless of the quality 
of high-level leadership, the degree of international political will, or the financial resources of 
the mission, the success of MONUSCO depends at least in part on the quality of peacekeeping 
troops. 
 
Collaboration on the Ground: Poorly Placed Priorities 
 Contemporary and independence-era criticisms of the UN’s operations in Congo 
undoubtedly cast doubt on the “neutrality” of the organization, suggesting an allegiance to 
Western interests (Fanon 1969, De Witte 2001, Nzongola 2012).  Potential ulterior motives 
notwithstanding, however, MONUSCO does in fact expend effort to engage with the host 
government in the DRC. Rather than an absolute lack of collaboration, problems arise with the 
way that MONUSCO chooses to prioritize its relationships with stakeholders in the DRC. The 
mission’s preference for elite-level political consultations reflects the legacy of past UN 
operations in their deference to host governments (Boutros-Ghali 1992, ICISS 2001). However, 
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in the Congo, such consultations often serve to systemically exclude Congolese communities. 
While community members do in fact report efforts by MONUSCO to promote dialogue, these 
reports reveal that such consultations categorically lack substance. Community members do not 
witness their recommendations put into practice by MONUSCO personnel. This leads some 
community members to conclude that the UN’s efforts to collaborate with Congolese 
communities prove a shallow attempt to feign inclusion. 
 The political context in today’s Congo renders the UN’s preference for political 
collaboration particularly shortsighted. Much of Congolese citizens feel that their current 
government does not adequately reflect the will of the Congolese people and is not responsive to 
their needs (Stearns 2011, Radio Okapi 2014a).  
 On a logistical level, substandard performance by the FARDC likewise constrains 
MONUSCO’s civilian protection capacity. This occurs as the mission must collaborate with 
FARDC in pursuit of armed groups in eastern Congo. Thus areas where the FARDC lacks 
resources or capacity necessarily entail limitations for MONUSCO. While MONUSCO may 
possess the internal capacity to protect Congolese civilians or neutralize an armed group in a 
given situation, if the FARDC is not present, MONUSCO cannot operate. 
 
Tourists in Blue Helmets: Shortchanging Congolese Civilians 
 This study finds that, despite minor improvements in mission capacity following the 
release of UNSC Resolution 2098, MONUSCO displays a perpetual failure to meet its primary 
objective: the protection of Congolese civilians. This failure arises both from the internal 
limitations of MONUSCO as well as from complexities with the dynamics of collaboration 
between MONUSCO and the Congolese state. While perpetual shortfalls do cast doubt on the 
credibility of MONUSCO, UN peacekeeping, and perhaps even the UN as an organization, 
Congolese civilians stand suffer the greatest losses if MONUSCO’s capacity to fulfill its 
objectives continue to fall short of the text of its mandate.  
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“MONUSCO pretends to come and bring peace. What people expect them to do is to 
come and bring peace, but sometimes they have their own agenda. We are really in 
need of peace. In the east of Congo, we have a lot of problems and a lot of challenges. 
When we were told that there would be a mission devoted to all of these problems, 
we thought that maybe things would change. What we see in the field and what 
people are expecting are two very different things” (UN Language Consultant, 
interview, June 2014). 
  
 This language consultant’s statement reflects a pervasive opinion among Congolese 
civilians that the UN fails to deliver on its promises.  More alarmingly, the consultant suggests a 
discrepancy between MONUSCO’s explicit objective- to “protect, stabilize, and consolidate 
peace”- and the mission’s underlying agenda. The consultant’s claims do not lack historical 
precedent, particularly in the Congolese case. In Toward an African Revolution (1969) Frantz 
Fanon writes, 
“It is not true to say that the UN fails because the cases are difficult. In reality the 
UN is a legal card used by the imperialist interests when the card of brute force 
has failed” (Fanon 1969, p. 195).  
 
 Fanon here references the complicity of ONUC in Belgium’s neo-colonial occupation of 
Katanga province and other parts of the Congo in the 1960s. In Lumumba Speaks (1961) and 
The Assassination of Lumumba (2001), Patrice Lumumba and Ludo De Witte, respectively, 
additionally implicate the UN as key player in the U.S.-Belgian plot to eliminate Congo’s first 
prime minister and inspire the rise of General Mobutu. The ONUC mission ostensibly operated 
in an effort to restore law and order following a succession of post-independence crises in July 
1960: the Congolese National Army (Armée Nationale Congolaise, or ANC) mutiny, the 
secession of Katanga province under Moise Tshombe, and the subsequent occupation of the 
region by Belgian troops. In his capacity as Prime Minister, Lumumba initially requested UN 
intervention in response to Belgium’s violation of Congolese sovereignty (Lumumba 1961). The 
mission quickly deviated from its ostensibly neutral role, prolonging Belgian occupation and 
undermining Lumumba’s political authority (Lumumba 1961, De Witte 2001).  
 While perhaps unfair to superimpose the sins of ONUC onto its 21st century successor, 
MONUSCO, the criticisms of Fanon, De Witte, and Lumumba remain worthy of careful 
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consideration, particularly given contemporary doubts regarding the UN’s motives in the Congo 
(Congolese Community Members, interview, June 2014; Nzongola 2012). The fact remains that 
the interests of powerful, wealthy countries prevail at the United Nations: for its part, the United 
States funds nearly 30% of the total U.N. peacekeeping budget (Power 2015). 3 out of the 5 
permanent seats on the UNSC belong to Western governments (UNSC 2015). In this climate of 
disproportionate influence, scrutiny must be applied to the motives behind UN peacekeeping 
decisions. 
 
 Whether due to a Western-dominated sub-agenda or more benignly to practical mission 
shortcomings,  the fact remains that MONUSCO represents a perpetual unfulfilled promise to 
many Congolese civilians. At best, the mission’s well-meaning initiatives fall short of tangibly 
benefitting Congolese civilians. At worst, MONUSCO represents a 15-year, billion-dollar façade, 
a mockery of peace where Congolese civilians remain the butt of a cruel joke. 
“We can tell you about their mandate because we hear what they tell us in the different 
meetings we attend. But if you ask other civilians who do not attend these meetings, they 
will tell you that MONUSCO troops are like tourists. They just come to visit and to steal 
riches from Congo. They are ‘working’ but they are not doing anything.” (Congolese 
Community Member, interview, June 2014). 
 
 While the comparison of UN peacekeepers to tourists might exaggerate the nature of 
MONUSCO’s inadequacy, the reflection by this community member channels years of 
frustration on the part of Congolese civilians in response to the unfulfilled promise of peace. In 
the nearly 1.5 years since MONUSCO’s 2013 mandate granted the mission increased power and 
authority to protect civilians in eastern DRC, the current slow rate of progress suggests that the 
mission is on track for yet another failed promise. If the international community is to make 
good on its promise to work with the DRC toward sustainable peace, MONUSCO cannot afford 
to neglect its internal shortcomings, nor can it fail to reform its strategy for working 
collaboratively with Congolese institutions. 
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Interview Script: UN Personnel 
 
! How long have you worked for the United Nations (UN)? 
 
! What do you claim as your nationality? 
 
! How long have you worked for the UN peacekeeping force in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (MONUSCO)? 
 
! Describe your work with MONUSCO. What are your primary responsibilities? 
 
! What is your understanding of the mandate of the UN peacekeeping force in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO)? 
 
! From your perspective, has MONUSCO been successful in fulfilling this mandate? Why 
or why not? 
 
! Do you have an opinion on how MONUSCO might become more effective in fulfilling its 
mandate? Please elaborate. 
 
! What do you see as the greatest challenges to the success of MONUSCO? 
 
! Have you observed any situations in which UN peacekeepers have harmed your 
community in some way? Please describe these situations. 
 
! In your opinion, what are the most significant positive achievements of MONUSCO to 
date? 
 
! In your opinion, how have the activities of MONUSCO changed during your time with 
the  mission (if they have not changed, you may state that you do not feel they have 
changed)? 
 
! In your opinion, has MONUSCO become more or less effective during this time?  
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Interview Script for Congolese Community Members 
 
! Have you ever had a first-hand encounter with United Nations (UN) peacekeeping 
forces? If so, please describe. 
 
! How often would you say that you interact with UN forces? Please describe the nature of 
these interactions. 
 
! What is your understanding of the mandate of the UN peacekeeping force in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO)? 
 
! From your perspective, has MONUSCO been successful in fulfilling this mandate? Why 
or why not? 
 
! Do you have an opinion on how MONUSCO might become more effective in fulfilling its 
mandate? Please elaborate. 
 
! What do you see as the greatest challenges to the success of MONUSCO? 
 
! Have you observed any situations in which UN peacekeepers have harmed your 
community in some way? Please describe these situations. 
 
! Have you witnessed any positive outcomes from the activities of UN peacekeepers in 
your community? Please be as specific as possible. 
 
! To the best of your knowledge, how long have UN peacekeeping forces been active in 
your community? 
 
! Have you noticed any changes in the activities of UN peacekeepers over the course of this 
time? Please elaborate. 
 
! In your opinion, has MONUSCO become more or less effective during this time? Why? 
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Map 1.1: UN and Armed Group Presence in the DRC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
